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One may surmise that this ‘companion in innocence’ style of argument may carry over to semantic realism as well. But I cannot afford the space to explain this surmise here.
See Cuneo (2007) about this and Cuneo and Kyriacou (MS).
Compare Enoch (2013) who insists on the ‘just too different intuition’ about the natural and the normative.
See for example the discussion in Midgley (2008).
Of course, indirectly, Velleman admits of pragmatic moral black holes that interconnect local moralities by means of the mutual interpretability standard of progress.
It is a difficult matter how to explain such reliability, especially given our evolutionary history (cf. Street (2006), but that is an independent question. For a response to the challenge see Enoch (2013).
Blackburn S (2006) Truth. Penguin, London
Boghossian P (2007) Fear of knowledge. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Cuneo T (2007) The normative web. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Cuneo Terence and Kyriacou Christos. ‘In Defense of the Moral\Epistemic Parity’. (MS)
Enoch D (2013) Taking morality seriously. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Midgley M (2008) Trying out one’s new sword. In: Joel F, Shafer-Landau R (eds) Reason and responsibility. Thomson Wadsworth, Belmont, pp 567–570
Sharon S (2006) A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value’. Philos Stud 127(1):109–166
Wedgwood R (2007) The nature of normativity. Oxford University Press, Oxford
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Kyriacou, C. Critical Discussion of David Velleman, Foundations for Moral Relativism, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2013. Pp. x +109. Price: £12.95.. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 18, 209–214 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9527-7