Abstract
While there is much literature on autonomy and the conditions for its attainment, there is less on how those conditions reflect on agents’ ordinary careers. Most people’s careers involve a great deal of subservient activity that would prevent the kind of control over agents’ actions that autonomy would seem to require. Yet, it would seem strange to deny autonomy to every agent who regularly follows orders at work—to do so would make autonomy a futile ideal. Most contemporary autonomy accounts provide purely theoretical analysis without reference to any practical goal that autonomy could serve. These accounts are likely to resolve this issue in one direction: either almost entirely including or excluding subservient workers from autonomy. Either solution would fail to distinguish agents who sufficiently control their lives, in spite of limited subservience, according to their own standards, from agents for whom subservience precludes a fulfilling life. I suggest the solution lies in a return to goal-oriented autonomy accounts, which can use the goal to distinguish when subservience overwhelms autonomy from when subservience and autonomy can coexist. I present an account that anchors autonomy in the happiness that it provides for agents who sufficiently control their lives as determined by their more important prudential standards. On this account, agents in subservient careers can be autonomous if they determine how to make their careers consistent with their happiness.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
For another subjective standard view, see Hill 1991: 21–4. Hill is interested in subjective standards for non-moral ways in which agents respect themselves, such as commitments to keep a clean house or to avoid obscene movies.
References
Arpaly N (2004) Unprincipled virtue. Oxford University Press, New York
Arpaly N (2005) Responsibility, applied ethics, and complex autonomy theories. In: Taylor JS (ed) Personal autonomy. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 162–182
Bayles M (1972) A concept of coercion. In: Pennock JR, Chapman J (eds) Coercion: Nomos XIV. Aldine, Chicago, pp 2–29
Beauchamp TL (2005) Who deserves autonomy, and whose autonomy deserves respect? In: Taylor JS (ed) Personal autonomy. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 310–329
Benson P (2005) Feminist intuitions and the normative substance of autonomy. In: Taylor JS (ed) Personal autonomy. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 124–142
Berlin I (1969) Liberty. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Brandt RB (1979) A theory of the good and the right. Prometheus Books, New York
Bratman M (2005) Planning agency, autonomous agency. In: Taylor JS (ed) Personal autonomy. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 33–57
Carr CL (1988) Coercion and freedom. Am Philos Q 25:59–67
Christman J (2001) Liberalism, autonomy, and self-transformation. Soc Theory Pract 27:185–206
Christman J (2007) Autonomy, history, and the subject of justice. Soc Theory Pract 33:1–26
Cooper J (2003) Stoic autonomy. In: Paul EF, Miller FD Jr, Paul J (eds) Autonomy. Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, Cambridge, pp 1–29
Darwall S (1983) Impartial reason. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Dworkin G (1988) The theory and practice of autonomy. Cambridge University Press, New York
Ekstrom LW (2005) Autonomy and personal integration. In: Taylor JS (ed) Personal autonomy. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 143–161
Feinberg J (1986) Harm to self. Oxford University Press, New York
Friedman M (2003) Autonomy, gender, politics. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Gert B (1972) Coercion and freedom. In: Pennock JR, Chapman J (eds) Coercion: Nomos XIV. Aldine, Chicago, pp 30–48
Gibbard A (1983) A noncognitivistic analysis of rationality in action. Soc Theory Pract 9:2–3, (Summer-Fall): 199–221
Hill TE Jr (1986) Darwall on practical reason. Ethics 96:604–619
Hill TE Jr (1991) Autonomy and self-respect. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Kant I (1785) Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. In: Gregor M (ed and trans) Practical philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, 37–108
Lehrer K (2003) Reason and autonomy. In: Paul EF, Miller FD Jr, Paul J (eds) Autonomy. Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, Cambridge, pp 177–198
McKenna M (2005) The relationship between autonomous and morally responsible agency. In: Taylor JS (ed) Personal autonomy. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 205–234
Mele A (2001) Autonomous agents. Oxford University Press, New York
Mill JS (1869) On liberty. Modern Library, New York, 2002
Noggle R (2005) Autonomy and the paradox of self-creation. In: Taylor JS (ed) Personal autonomy. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 87–108
Nozick R (1969) Coercion. In: Morgenbesser S, Suppes P, White M (eds) Philosophy, science, and method: essays in honor of Ernest Nagel. St. Martin’s Press, New York, pp 440–472
O’Neill O (2002) Autonomy and trust in bioethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Oshana M (2003) How much should we value autonomy? In: Paul EF, Miller FD Jr, Paul J (eds) Autonomy. Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, Cambridge, pp 99–126
Oshana M (2005) Autonomy and free agency. In: Taylor JS (ed) Personal autonomy. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 183–204
Oshana M (2006) Personal autonomy in society. Ashgate, Burlington
Railton P (1986) Moral realism. Philos Rev 95.2:163–207
Raz J (1986) The morality of freedom. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Richards DAJ (1981) Rights and autonomy. Ethics 92(1):3–20
Rosati CS (1995) Persons, perspectives, and full information accounts of the good. Ethics 105.2:296–325
Sobel D (1994) Full Information accounts of well-being. Ethics 104.4:784–810
Tiberius V (1997) Full information and ideal deliberation. J Value Inq 31:329–338
Young R (1980) Autonomy and socialization. Mind LXXXIX:565–576
Acknowledgements
I am incredibly grateful for comments from Barbara Herman, Calvin Normore, Jon Cogburn, Aaron Lercher, Matt Drabek, Mona Rocha, the two anonymous reviewers at this journal, and audiences at the Mid-South Philosophy Conference and the Alabama Philosophical Society.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Rocha, J. Autonomy Within Subservient Careers. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 14, 313–328 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9251-x
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9251-x