Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 13, Issue 4, pp 439–451 | Cite as

Some Versions of the Number Problem Have No Solution

  • Martin PetersonEmail author


This article addresses Taruek’s much discussed Number Problem from a non-consequentialist point of view. I argue that some versions of the Number Problem have no solution, meaning that no alternative is at least as choice-worthy as the others, and that the best way to behave in light of such moral indeterminacy is to let chance make the decision. I contrast my proposal with F M Kamm’s nonconsequentialist argument for saving the greatest number, the Argument for Best Outcomes, which I argue does not follow from the premises it is based on.


Number Problem Nonconsequentialism Fairness Kamm Moral indeterminacy 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Section for Philosophy and EthicsEindhoven University of TechnologyEindhovenThe Netherlands

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