Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 13, Issue 2, pp 153–169 | Cite as

A Royal Road to Consequentialism?

  • Martin PetersonEmail author


To consequentialise a moral theory means to account for moral phenomena usually described in nonconsequentialist terms, such as rights, duties, and virtues, in a consequentialist framework. This paper seeks to show that all moral theories can be consequentialised. The paper distinguishes between different interpretations of the consequentialiser’s thesis, and emphasises the need for a cardinal ranking of acts. The paper also offers a new answer as to why consequentialising moral theories is important: This yields crucial methodological insights about how to pursue ethical inquires.


Consequentialism Asymmetry Moral dilemma Portmore 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Section for Philosophy and EthicsEindhoven University of TechnologyEindhovenThe Netherlands

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