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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 13, Issue 1, pp 89–109 | Cite as

Effort and Moral Worth

  • Kelly SorensenEmail author
Article

Abstract

One of the factors that contributes to an agent’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness — his or her moral worth — is effort. On the one hand, agents who act effortlessly seem to have high moral worth. On the other hand, agents who act effortfully seem to have high moral worth as well. I explore and explain this pair of intuitions and the contour of our views about associated cases.

Keywords

Effort Moral worth 

Notes

Acknowledgements

My thanks to Shelly Kagan, Bob Adams, Allen Wood, Apryl Martin, Dan Graham, Steve Sverdlik, Owen McLeod, the anonymous referees, and audiences at the University of Memphis, the University of Washington, and Scripps College for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Ursinus CollegeCollegevilleUSA

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