Abstract
The paper investigates and refines the proportionalist solution to the causal exclusion problem developed by Menzies and List. First and foremost, it explores the implications of their inter-level compatibility result. It is highlighted that in theory the inter-level causal compatibility of realizer and realized properties allows for scenarios where the higher-level property is multiply realized. By developing concrete illustrations, the paper proves this to be an empirically plausible option. Further non-trivial implications of the framework are unpacked to show that the sensitivity of causal relations to background conditions is as important in deciding on the existence and the direction of exclusion as sensitivity to the realization of the cause. This insight also opens the way to further refinements: a richer reconceptualization of upwards exclusion and a plausible answer to a critic of the Menzies and List project.
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Notes
Not discussed in this paper, but one should mention the “causation first” approach by McDonnell (2017) according to which first and foremost we need to concentrate on the plausibility of our account of causation before we can attend to the question of exclusion. McDonnell argues that not all cases of causation conform to the proportionality constraint and therefore the M/L account is unstable. Maslen (2017) formulates an even broader criticism of the proportionality principle. If they are right, M/L has to face counterexamples to their interpretation of causal exclusion as well. Another criticism not discussed here (Christensen and Baysan, 2018) tells us that this solution to the exclusion problem cannot be reconciled with physicalism and amounts to a form of emergentism. I tend to give more credit to the latter criticism, but even if that stands, my argument still adds to our picture of higher-level causation.
Naturally, properties are not causes of properties.Only instances of properties cause instances of other properties. I follow Kim and Menzies in using this shorthand in speaking of properties as causes and effects.
This is a point where many philosophers might disagree and where recent criticisms mentioned in note 1 are highly relevant. As my aims are different, for the sake of the argument, I accept what M/L said about causation.
This interpretation of counterfactual causation deviates from Lewis’. His framework has no means to identify insufficiently specific candidate causes. To get rid of too loose candidate causes List & Menzies (2009, p. 485–486) and Menzies & List (2010, p. 114–115) allow that there are more worlds equally similar to the actual world instantiating the cause. According to them there are independent motivations for this move over and above the elimination of too loose candidate causes.
Stating the condition, I follow List & Menzies (2009, p. 495) with slight modifications to the notation.
Stating the condition, I follow the original List & Menzies (2009, p. 493) with some modifications to the notation.
What Menzies (2013, p. 66–67) has to say about mental causation and the possibility of reduction also suggests that M/L is committed to a liberal view on multiple realization and non-reductionism and therefore would probably reject inter-level identities as implausible. He criticizes the implicit reductive physicalism of those neuroscientists who claim to find identities between mental properties and general neural firing patterns arguing that the reduction base they talk about is an abstract aggregate property, not a concrete realizer property and therefore even if such reductions can be formulated the higher-level realized property and the realizer remain distinct. By analogy, he should reject the identity statement connecting temperature to mean kinetic energy in gases as a good example of inter-level property identity. As I don’t know of any better scientific example where identity statements connect different levels I guess M/L would be in a trouble if they had to provide examples of inter-level property identity. Certainly, this is compatible with their acknowledgement that identity is a logical possibility and it is an empirical matter whether there are identity scenarios.
I follow List & Menzies (2009, p. 491), the notation used for properties and the name of the condition is changed.
Gilman, a physicist, details the physics of mechanical hardness in solids. At present scientist believe that the mechanisms that underlay hardness (resistance to permanent deformation) are material kind specific. This is reflected by the fact that calculating hardness properties from lower-level information requires material kind specific models.
A useful analogy with the aggregate neural property (A) would be some general topological feature in geometry. E.g. concave decagons come in many particular shapes. Imagine that there is one particular form of five-armed star that fits seamlessly into a whole as that whole has the exact same shape. That particular concave decagon is analogous with the only particular neural realizer that can avoid the supposed intervention into the mental process M, because it has a particular physical “shape”. There are many other differently constructed concave decagons as there are many other possible neural realizers of A, but those cannot do the same job of avoiding the intervention into mental process M. Here the geometrical topology is analogous to some physical/neural “topology” A that we could build to unite different complex physical/neural realizers and that can be realized by many different particular “shapes”. This analogy certainly presupposes that the realizers have realization relevant and realization irrelevant features, but that is a supposition shared by most philosophers.
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Acknowledgements
The author is grateful for discussions with and feedback from Robin Hendry, Gábor Hofer-Szabó, Matthew Tugby, Stephen Barker and also for helpful comments and constructive criticism from two anonymous referees. This research was made possible by the ‘Lendület’ Morals and Science Research Group housed by the Eötvös Loránd Research Network
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While working on this research I was employed by the ‘Lendulet’ Morals and Science Research Group housed by the Eötvös Loránd Research Network.
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Kertész, G. Inter-level Causal Compatibility Without Identity. Erkenn 89, 1841–1859 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00606-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00606-x