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Self-Reference, Self-Representation, and the Logic of Intentionality

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Abstract

Representationalist accounts of mental content face the threat of the homunculus fallacy. In collapsing the distinction between the conscious state and the conscious subject, self-representational accounts of consciousness possess the means to deal with this objection. We analyze a particular sort of self-representational theory, built on the work of John von Neumann on self-reproduction, using tools from mathematical logic. We provide an explicit theory of the emergence of referential beliefs by means of modal fixed points, grounded in intrinsic properties yielding the subjective aspects of experience. Furthermore, we study complications introduced by allowing for the modification of such symbolic content by environmental influences.

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Notes

  1. I thank an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this point.

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    Jochen Szangolies

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Appendix A: A Self-Inspecting Quine

Appendix A: A Self-Inspecting Quine

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Szangolies, J. Self-Reference, Self-Representation, and the Logic of Intentionality. Erkenn 88, 2561–2590 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00467-w

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