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Review of Bayesian Philosophy of Science

Jan Sprenger and Stephan Hartmann, Bayesian Philosophy of Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019, ISBN 9,780,199,672,110, GBP 60,00.

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Notes

  1. Another somewhat unusual methodological feature of the book is the occasional use of computer modeling.

  2. Here I will only review one of two responses discussed by S & H.

  3. I should add that addressing this problem is not the main concern in Variation 12.

  4. It is sometimes thought that imaging (Lewis 1976) is the counterfactual counterpart to conditionalization, but imaging is not going to do what we need it to here. Imaging deals with the case where we are updating p(H) on counterfactual evidence E. But the case we are interested in here is how to update p(H|M) (i.e. a counterfactual degree of belief in H given M) on actual evidence E.

  5. Multiple influential textbooks adopt this viewpoint, including Gelman et al. (2013), and (to some extent) Bernardo and Smith (2000).

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Vassend, O.B. Review of Bayesian Philosophy of Science. Erkenn (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00431-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00431-8