Abstract
The defensibility of the extended mind thesis (EMT) is often thought to hinge on the possibility of extended selves. I argue that the self cannot extend and consider the ramifications of this finding, especially for EMT. After an overview of EMT and the supposed cruciality of the extended self to the defensibility of the former thesis, I outline several lines of argument in support of the possibility of extended selves. Each line of argument appeals to a different account of diachronic personal identity. I argue that no such argument for extended selves succeeds, as no account of diachronic personal identity is both plausible and supports the view that the self can extend. Next, I consider three objections that, if successful, would undercut the preceding argument that the self cannot extend. I conclude by reflecting on the implications of the conclusion that the self cannot extend, including the prospects for EMT.
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Notes
Critics of active externalism often direct their attention toward the stronger thesis that mental states sometimes are realized in features of the environment (Rupert 2004, 2009). I adopt a weaker interpretation of EMT here and a correspondingly weak interpretation of the extended self thesis (EST) below. In challenging the weak interpretation of EST, I will thereby challenge stronger versions of that thesis and of EMT.
It is a conspicuous feature of both critical and supportive discussions of EMT that these discussions typically focus on extended memory and extended belief, rather than extended mental states more generally—but see Susan Hurley (1998, 2010), Clark (2008), and Carter et al. (2016) for some notable exceptions. For present purposes, we need not go beyond this narrow focus.
For a thorough discussion of possible answers to question (1), see Olson (2007).
In the passage quoted above, Clark and Chalmers actually suggest two distinct accounts of the self. The view that Otto is a coupling of an organism and external resources is inconsistent with the view that Otto is a bundle of mental states. To reconcile the authors’ apparently commitment to two distinct accounts, I take Clark and Chalmers apparent commitment to the first account of the self to be shorthand for the view that Otto is realized or constituted by an organism together with external resources. Such shorthands are widely employed and typically harmless in the context of discussions of EMT, but it will be necessary to avoid them here.
Whereas Baker (2009) and Olson (2011) dispute EST principally on the basis of its implausible implications, the thrust of the critique to follow is that EST is not well motivated. Because the critique to follow is largely independent of the objections raised by Baker and Olson, I do not comment on their objections at length here.
Clark and Chalmers’s suggestion that the information in Otto’s notebook is, on the face of it, not subject to the sort of objection to which the suggestion that the notebook itself is part of Otto is subject.
For an early and clear endorsement of the systems reply, see Jack Copeland (1993, ch. 6).
In line with what has been said above, it is perhaps better to say that the subject that understands Chinese is not the system, but a hybrid individual realized by this system. In fact, some responses to the Chinese Room Argument emphasize a distinction between the Chinese room system and the subject it realizes (Cole 1991).
Participants in the debate over EMT typically do not observe the distinction between persons and the physical systems that realize them. Here and below, I import the distinction and apply it even where the authors discussed do not.
The memory view ascribed here to Locke is not alone in having this unwelcome implication. See Perry (1972) for an overview of some accounts with the same implication.
Given Otto’s condition, it may well be that N-Otto at t3 is, relative to B-Otto at t3, connected to B-Otto at t1 by denser chains of psychological connectedness. Even so, it remains the case that both later entities are psychologically continuous with B-Otto at t1.
Here we should acknowledge the consequence that, on the psychological criterion, B-Otto at t3 is also not quantitatively identical to B-Otto at t1 (Harris 2019).
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.
For a concrete example, see Daniel Dennett (1996, p. 138) and Heersmink’s (1845–1846) discussion of the removal of Alzheimer’s patients from their homes. The foregoing discussion suggests that while such acts do not amount to a dismantling of the self—at least not the self of any biological individual with Alzheimer’s disease—such acts may be equally as concerning as if they involved compromise of the self.
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Harris, K.R. Why the Self Does Not Extend. Erkenn 87, 2645–2659 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00320-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00320-6