There is a view on consciousness that has strong intuitive appeal and empirical support: the intermediate-level theory of consciousness, proposed mainly by Ray Jackendoff and by Jesse Prinz. This theory identifies a specific “intermediate” level of representation as the basis of human phenomenal consciousness, which sits between high-level non-perspectival thought processes and low-level disjointed feature-detection processes in the perceptual and cognitive processing hierarchy. In this article, we show that the claim that consciousness arises at an intermediate-level is true of some cognitive systems, but only in virtue of specific constraints on their active interactions with the environment. We provide ecological reasons for why certain processing levels in a cognitive hierarchy are privileged with respect to consciousness. We do this from the perspective of a prediction-error minimization model of perception and cognition, relying especially on the notion of active inference: the privileged level for consciousness depends on the specific dispositions of an organism concerned with inferring its policies for action. Such a level is indeed intermediate for humans, but this depends on the spatiotemporal resolution of the typical actions that a human organism can normally perform. Thus, intermediateness is not an essential feature of consciousness. In organisms with different action dispositions the privileged level or levels may differ as well.
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We use ‘consciousness’, ‘phenomenal consciousness’ and ‘phenomenal experience’ interchangeably to refer to the what it’s like to see, hear, touch, taste, etc. something (Nagel, 1974). Also, for reasons of length and focus, we wish to remain neutral on the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. If one accepts such a distinction, much of what we say in this article is directly relevant for access consciousness.
Here the term “cognitive” is used in a broader sense as to encompass, perceptual, affective and evaluative processes.
It should be noted, however, that Prinz (2012) engages with the mechanistic and functional questions as well, offering a detailed outline of what he takes to be the core neural mechanism realizing conscious experience, namely synchronization of some neural representations at the gamma frequency of 40 Hz. We do not engage with these further questions in this article.
Of course, the contents in the example are token-content, but the fact that they differ in the rate of change shows that, for Marr, they belong to different content types. .
We leave the nature of this relation unspecified, since we are not interested with the metaphysical question, as we clarify below.
PEM has been successfully applied to model and explain various phenomena in different perceptual and cognitive domains. Primary examples are binocular rivalry (Hohwy, et al. 2008), and the positive symptoms of schizophrenia (Fletcher and Frith, 2008). For an extensive review and discussion of successful applications of PEM see Clark (2015)
To better illustrate this point, one may rely on Egan’s distinction between mathematical and cognitive content of a representational vehicle (Egan, 2013). The mathematical contents, which are the only real contents, at each level of the PEM internal model’s hierarchy are of the same type, while the intentional contents of hypotheses, such as objects and their properties (e.g. relative and general location in the example above), are part of the explanatory gloss we attach to the theory in order to relate the underlying computations to one’s explanatory goal, which is, in our case, understanding the scope of phenomenal consciousness. Different levels of the hierarchy may be ascribed different intentional contents in the gloss depending on the spatiotemporal resolution of hypotheses at those levels. See also Wiese (2016) for a non-instrumentalist take on Egan’s cognitive contents in PP.
This point is neatly summarized by Clark (2015, p. 293), quoting Lawereyns when he talks about the contents of generative models: “The representations thus constructed [from the generative model] are ‘not actual re-presentations or duplicates of objects in the world but … incomplete, abstract code that makes predictions about the world and revises its predictions on the basis of interaction with the world (Lawereyns, 2012, p. 74)’”.
Here we shall take into account only typically developed organisms.
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing this issue.
Gregory (1996, p. 377)
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing us to this line of research.
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this worry.
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.
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We are grateful to the Ruhr University Research School PLUS for supporting mutual visits between Ruhr-Universität Bochum and Monash University in the years 2016–2017 during which this paper was conceived. FM is supported by the Mercator Research Center Ruhr (MERCUR) project Pr-2016-0016 and by the Center for Mind and Cognition of the Ruhr Universität Bochum. JH is supported by the Australian Research Council DP160102770 and DP190101805 and by the Research School Bochum and the Center for Mind and Cognition, Ruhr-University Bochum.
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Marchi, F., Hohwy, J. The Intermediate Scope of Consciousness in the Predictive Mind. Erkenn (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00222-7