Advertisement

Erkenntnis

pp 1–15 | Cite as

Hoping for Metanormative Realism

  • Anne JeffreyEmail author
Original Research

Abstract

Debates in metaethics about metanormative realism, quasi-realism, anti-realism, and nihilism mostly focus on epistemic reasons for beliefs about values. Very little has been said about our practical reasons for metaethical beliefs, and even less is said about practical reasons for other attitudes we might take toward metaethical views. This paper shows why a recent argument bucking that trend fails to show that we have practical reasons to believe realism over nihilism, but that for many of us, we do have practical reason to hope that what I call Optimistic Realism is true.

Notes

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Ted Poston, Kevin McCain, participants of the Hope and Optimism Midpoint Collaboratory Workshop, and the Alabama Philosophical Society Meeting for discussion and helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

References

  1. Boyd, R. (1988). How to be a moral realist. In G. Sayre-McCord (Ed.), Essays on moral realism (pp. 181–228). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Chignell, A. (2007). Belief in Kant. Philosophical Review, 116(3), 323–360.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Enoch, D. (2011). Taking morality seriously: A defense of robust realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Fantl, J., & McGrath, M. (2012). Pragmatic encroachment: It’s not just about knowledge. Episteme, 9(1), 27–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Hieronymi, P. (2013). The use of reasons in thought. Ethics, 124(1), 114–127.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Husi, S. (2011). Why reasons skepticism is not self-defeating. European Journal of Philosophy, 21(3), 424–449.Google Scholar
  7. Kahane, G. (2016). If nothing matters. Noûs, 50(2), 1–27.Google Scholar
  8. Leary, S. (2017). In defense of practical reasons for belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95(3), 529–542.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Martin, A. (2013). How we hope: A moral psychology. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Meirav, A. (2009). The nature of hope. Ratio, 22(2), 216–233.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Milona, M. (2018). Finding hope. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 49(5), 710–729.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Olson, J. (2014). Moral error theory: History, critique, defense. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Pettit, P. (2004). Hope and its place in mind. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 592(1), 152–165.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Ross, J. (2006). Rejecting ethical deflationism. Ethics, 116, 742–768.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Scanlon, T. M. (2014). Being realistic about reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Stanley, J. (2005). Knowledge and practical interests. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Street, S. (2006). A darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value. Philosophical Studies, 127, 109–166.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Streumer, B. (2008). Are there irreducible normative properties? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 136(4), 537–561.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Sturgeon, N. (2006). Moral explanations defended. In J. Dreier (Ed.), Contemporary debates in moral theory (pp. 241–262). Malden: Blackwell Publishing.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyBaylor UniversityWacoUSA

Personalised recommendations