Grounding pluralism is the view that there are multiple kinds of grounding. In this essay, I motivate and defend an explanation-theoretic view of grounding pluralism. Specifically, I argue that there are two kinds of grounding: why-grounding—which tells us why things are the case—and how-grounding—which tells us how things are the case.
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For a survey on constructivism in metaethics, see Street (2010).
You could interpret Tye as making claims of full ground, but the resulting scenario will be more controversial than necessary, for the current argument.
My language of ways of being true is not an endorsement of alethic pluralism—the view that there are multiple properties of truth. I only need the assumption that a proposition can be true in virtue of different entities.
See Armstrong (1983) for this view.
Berker (2018), for example, would not regard my theory as sufficiently pluralist, since the two kinds of grounding can be defined from a common source.
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Thanks to Stephen Yablo, Brad Skow, Jack Spencer, Sally Haslanger, Kate Vredenburgh, Matthias Jenny, Jon Litland, the anonymous reviewers, and audiences at MIT and the 2017 Central APA for their feedback on various versions of this paper.