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Erkenntnis

pp 1–17 | Cite as

Grounding Pluralism: Why and How

  • Kevin RichardsonEmail author
Original Research
  • 137 Downloads

Abstract

Grounding pluralism is the view that there are multiple kinds of grounding. In this essay, I motivate and defend an explanation-theoretic view of grounding pluralism. Specifically, I argue that there are two kinds of grounding: why-grounding—which tells us why things are the case—and how-grounding—which tells us how things are the case.

Notes

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Stephen Yablo, Brad Skow, Jack Spencer, Sally Haslanger, Kate Vredenburgh, Matthias Jenny, Jon Litland, the anonymous reviewers, and audiences at MIT and the 2017 Central APA for their feedback on various versions of this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and Religious StudiesNC State UniversityRaleighUSA

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