I argue that it is epistemically permissible to believe that P when it is epistemically rational to believe that P. Unlike previous defenses of this claim, this argument is not vulnerable to the claim that permissibility is being confused with excusability.
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To give just one example, White (2005) moves freely between talk of what it is rational for one to believe and what it is epistemically permissible for one to believe, without further elaboration. This is typical. Even Goldman—arch reliabilist—was moved to revise his thinking in order to respect the apparent equivalence of rationality and permissibility (1986).
Which Cohen (1984) relies on in the course of presenting the ‘new evil demon’ argument against externalism, and which many epistemologists have subsequently relied on. I’ll discuss new evil demon style arguments in more detail later.
In Hughes (forthcoming) I argued that we should reject the knowledge norm. This paper builds on that one by showing how similar considerations can be used to motivate a principled argument for the rationality norm.
The above notwithstanding, Cohen and Comesana briefly sketch a line of argument similar to the one I pursue in this article.
Various wordings of this principle can be found in the literature. I take this one from White (2005).
One can suspend judgement on P whilst having a high credence in it. To be clear, my claim is that do to that in this case would be too cautious.
The claim that rationality is necessary for permissibility is the contrapositive of II.
Given the standard assumption that knowledge entails rationality it is natural to think that knowledge normers are themselves committed to the truth of II. After all, if knowledge entails rationality, and you are obligated to only believe what you know, doesn’t it follow that you are obligated to only believe what it is rational for you to believe? And if so, isn’t II true? It turns out that the matter isn’t so straightforward. For one thing, the idea that knowledge entails rationality has recently been called into question (Lasonen-Aarnio 2010). But more importantly, knowledge normers are committed to saying that there are cases (like CAR) in which you are obligated to suspend judgement on P, even though it is irrational to do so. The upshot is that whilst they might want to agree that it is impermissible for you to believe that P when it is irrational for you to believe that P, they are not in a position to endorse II in full generality (i.e. as saying that for any doxastic attitude—suspension included—it is permissible to take that attitude just in case it is rational to take that attitude). Thanks to a referee for this journal for pointing out the need for clarification on this matter.
Williamson’s argument here is a development of the idea that we must draw a distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ norms. That distinction was first drawn by DeRose (2002).
Lackey (2007) appeals to game cases when discussing applications of the primary/secondary norm distinction to theorising about the epistemic norms of assertion. She does so for a different purpose to mine, though. Lackey wants to argue that the primary/secondary norm distinction is a spurious one. I only want to argue that we are not prone to mistakenly conflate the manifestation of disposition to violate an obligation, O, with an actual violation of O.
As Cohen and Comesaña (forthcoming) point out, given the pervasiveness of misleading evidence, a theory that posits dilemmas in order to rescue the truth or knowledge norms will be committed to saying that each of us faces dilemmas of this kind on a regular basis, which seems even more odd a position to take. On a different note, Friedman (2013) argues against the traditional view that one suspends on P just in case one has considered the question of whether P and neither believes nor disbelieves that P. She argues that it is possible to have no attitude at all towards a proposition even after having considered the question of whether or not it is true. Even if Friedman right, however, it’s hard to see how that might help those who would reject DP. If each of the attitudes belief, suspension, and disbelief, is impermissible, then taking no attitude towards P would be the only permissible course of action, and would thereby be obligatory. Knowledge normers who reject DP wouldn’t be committed to the possibility of epistemic dilemmas in the conventional sense, then, but the view that there can be cases in which one is obligated to take no attitude towards a proposition is, it seems to me, just as odd as a view on which there are epistemic dilemmas. Moreover, there is a fairly strong sense in which normal agents will be unable to fulfil this would-be obligation. So this line of argument runs afoul of the ‘ought-implies-can’ principle.
See also Hughes (forthcoming).
Note that even if suspension is the appropriate attitude to take towards P, this is still action guiding. If I want water, and I suspend judgement on what locations it is available in my vicinity, then I can use this desire/doxastic attitude combination to motivate seeking out more evidence on the question of where there is water available. By contrast, if I am obligated, as per the rejection of DP, to have no attitude at all, then I will be obligated to be in a state of mind in which I cannot even do this. Relatedly, it should be clear that this argument will still apply even if we reject the tradition account of suspension of judgement and replace it with Friedman’s account.
The distinction between rebutting and undercutting arguments is this: rebutting arguments are supposed to show that P is false. Undercutting arguments aren't supposed that P is false. Rather, they aim to undermine the putative evidential connection between a set of facts and the conclusion that is being drawn from them. (See Pollock 1986). I discussed the error theory in Hughes (forthcoming). I don't think I properly characterised it there, however. What I have said here better captures it.
Though of course I don't think we should agree with the error theorists about this. That's the point of my overall argument.
I don't mean to suggest here that one should always prefer, and seek, to be in a clear-cut case over a complex case. But equally one should not always prefer and seek to be in a complex case rather than a clear-cut case. One should go wherever the evidence leads.
See also Hughes (forthcoming).
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Thanks to Matthew McGrath, Herman Cappelen, Jessica Brown, Patrick Greenough, Torfinn Huvenes, Stewart Cohen, Clayton Littlejohn, and two anonymous referees for this journal for discussion and helpful feedback on earlier versions of this article.
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Hughes, N. Uniqueness, Rationality, and the Norm of Belief. Erkenn 84, 57–75 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9947-6