, Volume 84, Issue 1, pp 57–75 | Cite as

Uniqueness, Rationality, and the Norm of Belief

  • Nick HughesEmail author
Original Research


I argue that it is epistemically permissible to believe that P when it is epistemically rational to believe that P. Unlike previous defenses of this claim, this argument is not vulnerable to the claim that permissibility is being confused with excusability.



Thanks to Matthew McGrath, Herman Cappelen, Jessica Brown, Patrick Greenough, Torfinn Huvenes, Stewart Cohen, Clayton Littlejohn, and two anonymous referees for this journal for discussion and helpful feedback on earlier versions of this article.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University College DublinDublinIreland

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