Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Russell and the Temporal Contiguity of Causes and Effects

  • Original Research
  • Published:
Erkenntnis Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

There are some necessary conditions on causal relations that seem to be so trivial that they do not merit further inquiry. Many philosophers assume that the requirement that there could be no temporal gaps between causes and their effects is such a condition. Bertrand Russell disagrees. In this paper, an in-depth discussion of Russell’s argument against this necessary condition is the centerpiece of an analysis of what is at stake when one accepts or denies that there can be temporal gaps between causes and effects. It is argued that whether one accepts or denies this condition, one is implicated in taking on substantial and wide-ranging philosophical positions. Therefore, it is not a trivial necessary condition of causal relations and it merits further inquiry.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Baldwin, J. M. (Ed.). (1901). Dictionary of philosophy and psychology. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beauchamp, T., & Rosenberg, A. (1981). Hume and the problem of causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brand, M. (1980). Simultaneous causation. In P. van Inwagen (Ed.), Time and cause (pp. 137–153). Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Chakravartty, A. (2005). Causal realism: Events and processes. Erkenntnis, 63, 7–31.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, D. J. (2002). Does conceivability entail possibility? In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Conceivability and Possibility (pp. 145–200). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dainton, B. (2010). Time and space. Durham: Acumen Publishing Limited.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dasgupta, S. (2016). Metaphysical rationalism. Noûs, 50, 379–418.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dummett, M. (2000). Is time a continuum of instants? Philosophy, 75, 497–515.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dummett, M. (2003). How should we conceive of time? Philosophy, 78, 387–396.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dummett, M. (2005). Hume’s atomism about events: A response to Ulrich Meyer. Philosophy, 80, 141–144.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ehring, D. (1985). Simultaneous causation and causal chains. Analysis, 45, 98–102.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ehring, D. (1987). Non-simultaneous causation. Analysis, 47, 28–32.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Field, H. (2003). Causation in a physical world. In M. Loux & D. Zimmerman (Eds.), Oxford handbook of metaphysics (pp. 435–460). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hitchcock, C. (2007). What Russell got right. In H. Price & R. Corry (Eds.), Causation, physics, and the constitution of reality: Russell’s republic revisited (pp. 45–65). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huemer, M., & Kovitz, B. (2003). Causation as simultaneous and continuous. The Philosophical Quarterly, 53, 556–565.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hume, D. (1999). An enquiry concerning human understanding. In T. L. Beauchamp (Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Hume, D. (2000). A treatise of human nature. In D. F. Norton & M. J. Norton (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Kant, I. (1998). Critique of pure reason (P. Guyer & A. Wood, Trans.). New York: Cambridge University Press.

  • Kistler, M. (2002). Causation in contemporary analytical philosophy. In C. Esposito & P. Porro (Eds.), La Causalità-La Causalité-Die Kausalität-Causality (pp. 635–668). Turnhout: Brepols.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kleinschmidt, S. (2013). Reasoning without the principle of sufficient reason. In T. Goldschmidt (Ed.), The puzzle of existence: Why is there something rather than nothing? (pp. 47–79). New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kline, A. D. (1980). Are there cases of simultaneous causation? In PSA: Proceedings of the biennial meeting of the philosophy of science association 1980 (pp. 292–301).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kline, A. D. (1982). The ‘established maxim’ and causal chains. In PSA: Proceedings of the biennial meeting of the philosophy of science association 1982 (pp. 65–74).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kline, A. D. (1985). Humean causation and the necessity of temporal discontinuity. Mind, 94, 550–556.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy, 70, 556–567.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (Ed.) (1986). Causation. In: Philosophical papers, Volume II (pp. 159–213). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Lipkind, D. (1979). Russell on the notion of cause. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 9, 701–720.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lorente, M. (1976). Bases for a discrete special relativity. International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 15, 927–947.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lorente, M. (1986a). Space-time groups for the lattice. International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 25, 55–65.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lorente, M. (1986b). Physical models on discrete space and time. In B. Gruber & R. Lenczewski (Eds.), Symmetries in science II. Boston: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lorente, M. (1993). Representations of classical groups on the lattice and its application to the field theory on discrete space-time. In B. Gruber (Ed.), Symmetries in science VI. Boston: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ma, C. K. W. (1999). Causation & physics. Retrieved December 11, 2015, from arXiv:quant-ph/9906061.

  • Mackie, J. L. (1974). The cement of the universe. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mellor, D. H. (1995). The facts of causation. London: Routledge Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Meyer, U. (2005). Dummett on the time-continuum. Philosophy, 80, 135–140.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Noordhof, P. (1999). Probabilistic causation, preemption and counterfactuals. Mind, 108, 95–125.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paul, L. A., & Hall, N. (2013). Causation: A user’s guide. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Peirce, C. (1933). The logic of quantity. In C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss (Eds.), Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Vol. IV, pp. 85–152). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Price, H. (2014). Where would we be without counterfactuals? In M. C. Galavotti, D. Dieks, W. J. Gonzalez, S. Hartmann, T. Uebel, & M. Weber (Eds.), New directions in the philosophy of science (pp. 589–607). Cham: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross, D., & Spurrett, D. (2007). Russell’s thesis revisited. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58, 45–76.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B. (1912). On the notion of cause. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 13, 1–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shoemaker, S. (1969). Time without change. The Journal of Philosophy, 66, 363–381.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, B., & Varzi, A. (2000). Fiat and bona fide boundaries. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60, 401–420.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Trenholme, R. (1975). Causation and necessity. The Journal of Philosophy, 72, 444–465.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Varzi, A. (1997). Boundaries, continuity, and contact. Noûs, 31, 26–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Waterlow, S. (1974). Backwards causation and continuing. Mind, 78, 372–387.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Watkins, E. (2005). Kant and the metaphysics of causality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weaver, C. G. (2013). A Church–Fitch proof for the universality of causation. Synthese, 190, 2749–2772.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weber, Z., & Cotnoir, A. J. (2015). Inconsistent boundaries. Synthese, 192, 1267–1294.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yablo, S. (1997). Wide causation. Philosophical Perspectives, 11, 251–281.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Sara Bernstein, Anjan Chakravartty, Xavi Lanao, Samuel Newlands, Caleb Ontiveros, Mark Puestohl, Sebastian Murgueitio Ramirez, Norman Sieroka, and Jeremy Steeger for discussion, guidance, and helpful comments on earlier drafts.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Notre Dame, 100 Malloy Hall, Notre Dame, IN, 46556, USA

    Graham Clay

Authors
  1. Graham Clay
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Graham Clay.

Appendix: Russell’s Overall Argument

Appendix: Russell’s Overall Argument

Show: ~NTG

  1. P1.

    ~~NTG. [assumption for reductio proof]

  2. P2.

    Either both causes and effects are instantaneous, or not. [disjunction introduction]

  3. P3.

    Both causes and effects are instantaneous. [assumption for conditional proof]

  4. P4.

    If both causes and effects are instantaneous, then there is a duration between them.

  5. P5.

    If there is a duration between causes and effects, then ~NTG.

  6. P6.

    ~NTG. [P3, P4, P5, modus ponens]

  7. P7.

    If both causes and effects are instantaneous, then ~NTG. [P3, P6, conditional proof]

  8. P8.

    It is not the case that both causes and effects are instantaneous. [P1, P7, modus tollens]

  9. P9.

    Causes are not instantaneous. [P8, Baldwin’s definition]

  10. P10.

    Either causes are processes that undergo change over time, or causes are static through time and do not change. [P9]

  11. P11.

    Causes are processes that undergo change over time. [assumption for reductio proof]

  12. P12.

    If causes are processes that undergo change over time, then they have temporal parts.

  13. P13.

    Causality is universal.

  14. P14.

    If causes have temporal parts, causality is universal, and NTG, then each temporal part of a cause could only be caused by the temporal part prior to it and could only cause the temporal part posterior to it.

  15. P15.

    If each temporal part of a cause could only be caused by the temporal part prior to it and could only cause the temporal part posterior to it, then only the last temporal part of the cause could be the cause of the first temporal part of the effect.

  16. P16.

    There could not be a last temporal part of a cause.

  17. P17.

    Only the last temporal part of a cause could be the cause of the first temporal part of its effect, and there could not be a last temporal part of a cause. [P11, P12, P13, P14, P15, modus ponens, P16, conjunction introduction]

  18. P18.

    There are no causes that are processes that undergo change over time. [P17]

  19. P19.

    There are causes that are processes that undergo change over time.

  20. P20.

    It is not the case that causes are processes that undergo change over time. [P11, P18, P19, reductio proof]

  21. P21.

    Causes are static and do not change over time. [P10, P20, disjunctive syllogism]

  22. P22.

    If causes are static and do not change over time, then there are no causes in nature and there are no explanations of why effects occur when they do.

  23. P23.

    It is not the case that there are no causes in nature and there are no explanations of why effects occur when they do.

  24. P24.

    It is not the case that causes are static and do not change over time. [P22, P23, modus tollens]

  25. P25.

    ~NTG [P1, P21, P24, reductio proof]

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Clay, G. Russell and the Temporal Contiguity of Causes and Effects. Erkenn 83, 1245–1264 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9939-6

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9939-6

Search

Navigation