, Volume 82, Issue 6, pp 1367–1380 | Cite as

Non-literal Lies

  • Emanuel ViebahnEmail author
Original Research


Many recent definitions of lying are based on the notion of what is said. This paper argues that says-based definitions of lying cannot account for lies involving non-literal speech, such as metaphor, hyperbole, loose use or irony. It proposes that lies should instead be defined in terms of assertion, where what is asserted need not coincide with what is said. And it points to possible implications this outcome might have for the ethics of lying.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyHumboldt University of BerlinBerlinGermany

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