Erkenntnis

, Volume 82, Issue 4, pp 929–946 | Cite as

Against Naturalized Cognitive Propositions

Original Research

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Scott Soames’ theory of naturalized cognitive propositions (hereafter, ‘NCP’) faces a serious objection: there are true propositions for which NCP cannot account. More carefully, NCP cannot account for certain truths of mathematics unless it is possible for there to be an infinite intellect. For those who reject the possibility of an infinite intellect, this constitutes a reductio of NCP.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentNiagara UniversityLewistonUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Notre DameNotre DameUSA

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