Erkenntnis

, Volume 82, Issue 4, pp 739–760 | Cite as

The Collapse of Logical Pluralism has been Greatly Exaggerated

Original Research

Abstract

According to the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall, there are several distinct relations of logical consequence. Some critics argue that logical pluralism suffers from what I call the collapse problem: that despite its intention to articulate a radically pluralistic doctrine about logic, the view unintentionally collapses into logical monism. In this paper, I propose a contextualist resolution of the collapse problem. This clarifies the mechanism responsible for a plurality of logics and handles the motivating data better than the original view. It is a major improvement that should be embraced by all logical pluralists.

Keywords

Logical Consequence Classical Logic Intuitionistic Logic Normative Principle Doxastic Position 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the following people for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper: Jamin Asay, Ben Burgis, Aiste Celkyte, Petr Cintula, Roy Cook, Yasuo Deguchi, Jiwon Kim, Hitoshi Omori, Nikolaj Pedersen, Jisoo Seo, Zach Weber, and Jeremy Wyatt.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Yonsei UniversitySeoulKorea

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