The Collapse of Logical Pluralism has been Greatly Exaggerated
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According to the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall, there are several distinct relations of logical consequence. Some critics argue that logical pluralism suffers from what I call the collapse problem: that despite its intention to articulate a radically pluralistic doctrine about logic, the view unintentionally collapses into logical monism. In this paper, I propose a contextualist resolution of the collapse problem. This clarifies the mechanism responsible for a plurality of logics and handles the motivating data better than the original view. It is a major improvement that should be embraced by all logical pluralists.
KeywordsLogical Consequence Classical Logic Intuitionistic Logic Normative Principle Doxastic Position
I would like to thank the following people for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper: Jamin Asay, Ben Burgis, Aiste Celkyte, Petr Cintula, Roy Cook, Yasuo Deguchi, Jiwon Kim, Hitoshi Omori, Nikolaj Pedersen, Jisoo Seo, Zach Weber, and Jeremy Wyatt.
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