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Erkenntnis

, Volume 82, Issue 2, pp 327–338 | Cite as

Freedom with Causation

  • Justin A. CapesEmail author
Original Article

Abstract

Our actions have causes, some of which are beyond our control. Of that there can be no serious doubt. Some worry that this fact undermines the commonsense view that we perform free actions for which we are morally responsible. My aim in this article is to show that such worries are unfounded and, consequently, that pure non-causal theories of free action, according to which free actions must be entirely uncaused, are false. My argument for this conclusion doesn’t presuppose the cogency of existing objections to non-causal theories of free agency.

Keywords

Moral Responsibility Free Action Causal Theory Democratic Process Free Agency 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and HumanitiesEast Tennessee State UniversityJohnson CityUSA

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