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Erkenntnis

, Volume 82, Issue 1, pp 45–64 | Cite as

Necessary Connections in Context

  • Alex KaisermanEmail author
Original Article

Abstract

This paper combines the ancient idea that causes necessitate their effects with Angelika Kratzer’s semantics of modality. On the resulting view, causal claims quantify over restricted domains of possible worlds determined by two contextually determined parameters. I argue that this view can explain a number of otherwise puzzling features of the way we use and evaluate causal language, including the difference between causing an effect and being a cause of it, the sensitivity of causal judgements to normative facts, and the semantics of causal disagreements.

Keywords

Short Circuit Modal Base Causal Claim Moral Fact Causal Judgement 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to John Hawthorne, Ofra Magidor, Delia Graff Fara, Laurie Paul, Boris Kment and an anonymous referee for comments on previous drafts of this paper. Thanks also to audiences in Austin, New York, Princeton and Stockholm for helpful questions.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Jesus CollegeUniversity of OxfordOxfordUK

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