Erkenntnis

, Volume 81, Issue 3, pp 649–668 | Cite as

From Isolation to Skepticism

Original Article

Abstract

If moral properties lacked causal powers, would moral skepticism be true? I argue that it would. Along the way I respond to various arguments that it would not.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyAuburn UniversityAuburnUSA

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