In a recent paper in this journal (2014), we proposed two novel puzzles associated with the precautionary principle. Both are puzzles that materialise, we argue, once we investigate the principle through an epistemological lens, and each constitutes a philosophical hurdle for any proponent of a plausible version of the precautionary principle. Steglich-Petersen (Erkenntnis 1–9, 2014) claims, also in this journal, that he has resolved our puzzles. In this short note, we explain why we remain skeptical.
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