Erkenntnis

, Volume 80, Issue 6, pp 1205–1215 | Cite as

On Knockdown Arguments

Critical Discussion

Abstract

Nathan Ballantyne (Erkenntnis 79, 2014) argues that the knockdown status of certain non-philosophical arguments can be transferred to arguments for substantive philosophical conclusions. Thus, if there are knockdown non-philosophical arguments, there are knockdown philosophical arguments. I show that Ballantyne’s argument is unsound, since arguments that are knockdown in non-philosophical contexts may become question-begging when used to argue for philosophical conclusions.

Keywords

Meta-philosophy Ballantyne Lewis Van Inwagen Knockdown arguments 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyNiagara UniversityNiagara UniversityUSA

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