, Volume 80, Issue 6, pp 1205–1215

On Knockdown Arguments

Critical Discussion

DOI: 10.1007/s10670-014-9720-z

Cite this article as:
Keller, J.A. Erkenn (2015) 80: 1205. doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9720-z


Nathan Ballantyne (Erkenntnis 79, 2014) argues that the knockdown status of certain non-philosophical arguments can be transferred to arguments for substantive philosophical conclusions. Thus, if there are knockdown non-philosophical arguments, there are knockdown philosophical arguments. I show that Ballantyne’s argument is unsound, since arguments that are knockdown in non-philosophical contexts may become question-begging when used to argue for philosophical conclusions.


Meta-philosophy Ballantyne Lewis Van Inwagen Knockdown arguments 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyNiagara UniversityNiagara UniversityUSA

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