Genetic Models in Evolutionary Game Theory: The Evolution of Altruism
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While prior models of the evolution of altruism have assumed that organisms reproduce asexually, this paper presents a model of the evolution of altruism for sexually reproducing organisms using Hardy–Weinberg dynamics. In this model, the presence of reciprocal altruists allows the population to evolve to a stable polymorphic population where the majority of organisms are altruistic. Further, adding stochasticity leads to even larger numbers of altruists, while adding stochasticity to an analogous asexual model leads to more selfish organisms. The contrast between these outcomes demonstrates why it may be important to pay attention to the underlying genetics of a population.
KeywordsGenetic Model Finite Population Replicator Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory Reciprocal Altruist
I would like to thank Simon Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, Justin Bruner, Cailin O’Connor audiences at GIRLS 2014 and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. I would also like to thank Zac Ernst, Paul Weirich, André Ariew, and Philip Robbins for their help on a previous version of this paper.
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