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Erkenntnis

, Volume 80, Issue 6, pp 1175–1189 | Cite as

Genetic Models in Evolutionary Game Theory: The Evolution of Altruism

  • Hannah RubinEmail author
Original Article

Abstract

While prior models of the evolution of altruism have assumed that organisms reproduce asexually, this paper presents a model of the evolution of altruism for sexually reproducing organisms using Hardy–Weinberg dynamics. In this model, the presence of reciprocal altruists allows the population to evolve to a stable polymorphic population where the majority of organisms are altruistic. Further, adding stochasticity leads to even larger numbers of altruists, while adding stochasticity to an analogous asexual model leads to more selfish organisms. The contrast between these outcomes demonstrates why it may be important to pay attention to the underlying genetics of a population.

Keywords

Genetic Model Finite Population Replicator Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory Reciprocal Altruist 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Simon Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, Justin Bruner, Cailin O’Connor audiences at GIRLS 2014 and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. I would also like to thank Zac Ernst, Paul Weirich, André Ariew, and Philip Robbins for their help on a previous version of this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of California IrvineIrvineUSA

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