, Volume 80, Issue 1, pp 215–227 | Cite as

Deception in Sender–Receiver Games

  • Manolo MartínezEmail author
Original Article


Godfrey-Smith advocates for linking deception in sender-receiver games to the existence of undermining signals. I present games in which deceptive signals can be arbitrarily frequent, without this undermining information transfer between sender and receiver.


Deception Sender–receiver games Skyrms Godfrey-Smith 



I would like to thank Peter Godfrey-Smith and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments to earlier drafts. Research for this paper was supported by the Spanish government via research grants MCINN FFI2011-26853 and CSD2009-0056 (CONSOLIDER INGENIO).


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Logos - Logic, Language and Cognition Research GroupUniversitat Autònoma de BarcelonaBellaterra, BarcelonaSpain

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