Deception in Sender–Receiver Games
Godfrey-Smith advocates for linking deception in sender-receiver games to the existence of undermining signals. I present games in which deceptive signals can be arbitrarily frequent, without this undermining information transfer between sender and receiver.
KeywordsDeception Sender–receiver games Skyrms Godfrey-Smith
I would like to thank Peter Godfrey-Smith and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments to earlier drafts. Research for this paper was supported by the Spanish government via research grants MCINN FFI2011-26853 and CSD2009-0056 (CONSOLIDER INGENIO).
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