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Erkenntnis

, Volume 80, Issue 1, pp 185–200 | Cite as

Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge

  • Katalin FarkasEmail author
Original Article

Abstract

Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis.

Keywords

True Belief Visual Experience Extended Mind Epistemic Virtue False Proposition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Talks bearing more or less close relation to this paper were presented at the 2013 Pacific APA meeting, at the 2013 Swedish Congress of Philosophy and at a workshop on the Varieties of Externalism in Edinburgh. Thanks to Brie Gertler, Sandy Goldberg and Tim Crane for discussion, and to Timothy E. Kunke for commenting on the talk in Edinburgh. Two anonymous referees for Erkenntnis provided very constructive suggestions for revision.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyCentral European UniversityBudapestHungary

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