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Testimony and Other Minds

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Abstract

In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to the usual suspects: Craig French, Nick Jones, Rory Madden, Matt Parrott, Ian Phillips, Lee Walters.

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Correspondence to Anil Gomes.

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Gomes, A. Testimony and Other Minds. Erkenn 80, 173–183 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9619-8

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