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Erkenntnis

, Volume 80, Issue 1, pp 173–183 | Cite as

Testimony and Other Minds

  • Anil Gomes
Original Article

Abstract

In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.

Keywords

Perceptual Experience External World Phenomenal Character Mental Life Basic Source 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to the usual suspects: Craig French, Nick Jones, Rory Madden, Matt Parrott, Ian Phillips, Lee Walters.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Trinity CollegeUniversity of OxfordOxfordUK

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