, Volume 79, Supplement 3, pp 567–595

Two-Dimensionalism and the Social Character of Meaning

Original Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10670-013-9553-1

Cite this article as:
Ball, D. Erkenn (2014) 79(Suppl 3): 567. doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9553-1


This paper develops and critiques the two-dimensionalist account of mental content developed by David Chalmers. I first explain Chalmers’s account and show that it resists some popular criticisms. I then argue that the main interest of two-dimensionalism lies in its accounts of cognitive significance and of the connection between conceivability and possibility. These accounts hinge on the claim that some thoughts have a primary intension that is necessarily true. In this respect, they are Carnapian, and subject to broadly Quinean attack. The remainder of the paper advances such an attack. I argue that there are possible thinkers who are willing to revise their beliefs in response to expert testimony (in a way familiar by Burge’s famous cases), and that such thinkers will have no thoughts with necessary primary intensions. I even suggest that many actual humans may well be such thinkers. I go on to argue that these possible thinkers show that the two-dimensionalist accounts fail.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of St AndrewsSt Andrews, FifeScotland, UK

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