Anti-luck (Too Weak) Virtue Epistemology
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I argue that Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology is insufficient for knowledge. I show that Pritchard fails to achieve the aim that motivates his adoption of a virtue-theoretic condition in the first place: to guarantee the appropriate direction of fit that known beliefs have. Finally, I examine whether other virtue-theoretic accounts are able to explain what I call the direction of fit problem.
KeywordsEpistemic luck Direction of fit Duncan Pritchard Safety Virtue epistemology
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