, Volume 79, Issue 4, pp 733–754 | Cite as

Anti-luck (Too Weak) Virtue Epistemology

  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal
Critical Discussion


I argue that Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology is insufficient for knowledge. I show that Pritchard fails to achieve the aim that motivates his adoption of a virtue-theoretic condition in the first place: to guarantee the appropriate direction of fit that known beliefs have. Finally, I examine whether other virtue-theoretic accounts are able to explain what I call the direction of fit problem.


Epistemic luck Direction of fit Duncan Pritchard Safety Virtue epistemology 



I am grateful to Fernando Broncano Rodríguez, Chris Kelp, Joan Pagès, Manuel Pérez Otero, as well as the audience of the 2011 European Epistemology Network Meeting held at Lund University (March 2011) for helpful comments. This work was supported by the Research Projects ‘The Naturalization of Subjectivity’ (ref. FFI2010-15717), ‘Modal Aspects of Materialist Realism’ (ref. HUM2007-61108) and Consolider-Ingenio project CSD2009-00056.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departament de Filosofia, Facultat de LletresUniversitat de GironaGironaSpain

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