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Erkenntnis

, Volume 79, Supplement 6, pp 1219–1252 | Cite as

Two Concepts of Plausibility in Default Reasoning

  • Hans Rott
Original Article

Abstract

In their unifying theory to model uncertainty, Friedman and Halpern (1995–2003) applied plausibility measures to default reasoning satisfying certain sets of axioms. They proposed a distinctive condition for plausibility measures that characterizes “qualitative” reasoning (as contrasted with probabilistic reasoning). A similar and similarly fundamental, but more general and thus stronger condition was independently suggested in the context of “basic” entrenchment-based belief revision by Rott (1996–2003). The present paper analyzes the relation between the two approaches to formalizing basic notions of plausibility as used in qualitative default reasoning. While neither approach is a special case of the other, translations can be found that elucidate their relationship. I argue that Rott’s notion of plausibility allows for a more modular set-up and has a better philosophical motivation than that of Friedman and Halpern.

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank David Etlin, Joe Halpern, Hannes Leitgeb, an anonymous referee of Erkenntnis, as well as audiences of two workshops on Halpern’s work (July 2011) and on “Philosophical Issues in Belief Revision, Conditionals and Possible Worlds Semantics” (September 2012) at the University of Konstanz, and of the Ninth Annual Formal Epistemology Workshop in Munich (May/June 2012) for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. They have led to substantial improvements.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of RegensburgRegensburgGermany

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