Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology: Response to Vaesen
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In a recent exchange, Vaesen (Synthese 181: 515–529, 2011; Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) and Kelp (Erkenntnis 78:245–252, 2013a) have argued over whether cases of extended cognition pose (part of) a problem for robust virtue epistemology. This paper responds to Vaesen’s (Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) most recent contribution to this exchange. I argue that Vaesen latest argument against the kind of virtue epistemology I favour fails.
KeywordsTrue Belief Present Account Gettier Case Cognitive Competence Cognitive Success
Thanks to Harmen Ghijsen and an anonymous referee for comments on earlier versions of this paper. This work was funded by a postdoctoral research fellowship with Research Foundation—Flanders.
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