Advertisement

Erkenntnis

, Volume 79, Issue 3, pp 729–732 | Cite as

Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology: Response to Vaesen

  • Christoph KelpEmail author
Critical Discussion

Abstract

In a recent exchange, Vaesen (Synthese 181: 515–529, 2011; Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) and Kelp (Erkenntnis 78:245–252, 2013a) have argued over whether cases of extended cognition pose (part of) a problem for robust virtue epistemology. This paper responds to Vaesen’s (Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) most recent contribution to this exchange. I argue that Vaesen latest argument against the kind of virtue epistemology I favour fails.

Keywords

True Belief Present Account Gettier Case Cognitive Competence Cognitive Success 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Harmen Ghijsen and an anonymous referee for comments on earlier versions of this paper. This work was funded by a postdoctoral research fellowship with Research Foundation—Flanders.

References

  1. Greco, J. (2003). Knowledge as credit for true belief. In M. DePaul & L. Zagzebski (Eds.), Intellectual virtue: Perspectives from ethics and epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Greco, J. (2010). Achieving knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Kelp, C. (2011). In defence of virtue epistemology. Synthese 179, 409–433.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Kelp, C. (2013a). Extended cognition and robust virtue epistemology. Erkenntnis 78, 245–252.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Kelp, C. (2013b). Knowledge: The safe-apt view. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91, 265–278.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Kelp, C. (2013c). Knowledge, understanding and virtue. In A. Fairweather (Eds.), Virtue scientia. Virtue epistemology and philosophy of science. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
  7. Lackey, J. (2007). Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know. Synthese 158, 345–361.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Lackey, J. (2009). Knowledge and credit. Philosophical Studies 142, 27–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Pritchard D. (2008). Greco on knowledge: Virtues, contexts, achievements. The Philosophical Quarterly 58, 437–447.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Pritchard, D. (2009). Knowledge and virtue: Response to Kelp. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17, 589–596.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Sosa, E. (2007). A virtue epistemology. Apt belief and reflective knowledge (Vol. 1). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Sosa, E. (2010). How competence matters in epistemology. Philosophical Perspectives 24, 465–475.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Sosa, E. (2011). Knowing full-well. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  14. Vaesen, K. (2011). Knowledge without credit, exhibit 4: Extended cognition. Synthese 181, 515–529.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Vaesen, K. (2013). Critical discussion: Virtue epistemology and extended cognition: A reply to Kelp and Greco. Erkenntnis 78, 963–970.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Logic and Analytic PhilosophyKU LeuvenLeuvenBelgium

Personalised recommendations