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Erkenntnis

, Volume 78, Supplement 2, pp 299–320 | Cite as

Causality Reunified

  • Michael StrevensEmail author
Original Article

Abstract

Hall has recently argued that there are two concepts of causality, picking out two different kinds of causal relation. McGrath, and Hitchcock and Knobe, have recently argued that the facts about causality depend on what counts as a “default” or “normal” state, or even on the moral facts. In the light of these claims you might be tempted to agree with Skyrms that causal relations constitute, metaphysically speaking, an “amiable jumble”, or with Cartwright that ‘causation’, though a single word, encompasses many different kinds of things. This paper argues, drawing on the author’s recent work on explanation, that the evidence adduced in support of causal pluralism can be accommodated easily by a unified theory of causality—a theory according to which all singular causal claims concern the same fundamental causal network.

Keywords

Causal Influence Causal Claim Counterfactual Dependence Concrete Event Causal Reality 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

For valuable comments, thanks to the anonymous referees and to Laura Franklin-Hall, who never fails to feed the fish.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyNew York UniversityNew York CityUSA

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