This paper synthesizes confirmation by instances and confirmation by successful predictions, and thereby the Hempelian and the hypothetico-deductive traditions in confirmation theory. The merger of these two approaches is subsequently extended to the piecemeal confirmation of entire theories. It is then argued that this synthetic account makes a useful contribution from both a historical and a systematic perspective.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.
Buy single article
Instant access to the full article PDF.
Price includes VAT for USA
Subscribe to journal
Immediate online access to all issues from 2019. Subscription will auto renew annually.
This is the net price. Taxes to be calculated in checkout.
Borsboom, D., & Haig, B. D. (2013). How to practise Bayesian statistics outside the Bayesian church: What philosophy for Bayesian statistical modeling? British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 66, 39–44.
Carnap, R. (1950). The logical foundations of probability. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Dietrich, F., & Moretti, L. (2005). On Coherent Sets and the Transmission of Confirmation. Philosophy of Science, 72, 403–424.
Fitelson, B., & Hawthorne, J. (2010). How Bayesian confirmation theory handles the paradox of the ravens. In E. Eells, & J. Fetzer (Eds.) The place of probability in science (pp. 247–275). New York: Springer.
Gelman, A., & Shalizi, C. (2012). Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics in the social sciences. In H. Kincaid (Ed.) Oxford handbook of the philosophy of the social sciences (pp. 259–273). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gelman, A., & Shalizi, C. (2013). Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics (with discussion). British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 66, 8–18.
Gemes, K. (1993). Hypothetico-deductivism, content and the natural axiomatisation of theories. Philosophy of Science, 60, 477–487.
Gemes, K. (1997). A new theory of content II: Model theory and some alternatives. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 26, 449–476.
Gemes, K. (1998). Hypothetico-deductivism: The current state of play. Erkenntnis, 49, 1–20.
Gemes, K. (2006). Content and Watkins’ account of natural axiomatizations. Dialectica, 60, 85–92.
Glymour, C. (1980a). Theory and evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Glymour, C. (1980b). Discussion: hypothetico-deductivism is hopeless. Philosophy of Science, 47, 322–325.
Hempel, C. G. (1943). A purely syntactical definition of confirmation. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 8, 122–143.
Hempel, C. G. (1945/65). Studies in the logic of confirmation. In Aspects of scientific explanation, (pp. 3-46). New York: The Free Press. Reprint from Mind 54, 1945.
Huber, F. (2008). Hempel’s logic of confirmation. Philosophical Studies, 139, 181–189.
Kuipers, T. (2000). From instrumentalism to constructive realism. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Mayo, D. G. (1996). Error and the growth of experimental knowledge. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
Nicod, J. (1925). Le problème logique de l’induction. Paris: Alcan.
Popper, K. R. (1934/71). Logik der Forschung, 3rd edn. Tübingen: Mohr.
Schurz, G. (1991). Relevant deduction. Erkenntnis, 35, 391-437.
Schurz, G. (2005). Bayesian H-D confirmation and structuralistic truthlikeness: Discussion and comparison with the relevant-element and the content-part approach. In R. Festa (Ed.) Logics of scientific discovery. Essays in debate with Theo Kuipers (pp. 141–159). Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Whewell, W. (1847). Philosophy of the inductive sciences, founded upon their history, Vol. II. London: Parker.
About this article
Cite this article
Sprenger, J. A Synthesis of Hempelian and Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation. Erkenn 78, 727–738 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9487-7
- Content Part
- Harmonic Oscillator Model
- Entire Theory
- Logical Entailment