Erkenntnis

, Volume 79, Supplement 2, pp 259–277 | Cite as

Pluralism × 3: Truth, Logic, Metaphysics

Original Article

Abstract

This paper offers a discussion of metaphysical pluralism, alethic pluralism, and logical pluralism. According to the metaphysical pluralist, there are several ways of being. According to the alethic pluralist, there are several ways of being true, and according to the logical pluralist, there are several ways of being valid. Each of these three forms of pluralism will be considered on its own, but the ambition of the paper is to explore possible connections between them. My primary objective is to present and develop a positive account according to which the different forms of pluralism are intimately related. I will proceed in two steps. First, I will investigate the connection between alethic pluralism and logical pluralism. I will argue that a certain version of alethic pluralism supports logical pluralism. Second, I will connect alethic pluralism and logical pluralism to metaphysical pluralism. I will suggest that the former two are at least partly founded on the latter.

References

  1. 1.
    Beall, J. C., & Restall, G. (2006). Logical pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    David, M. The correspondence theory of truth. In Zalta, E. (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 201 Edition). URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#3.
  3. 3.
    Edwards, D. (2011). Simplifying alethic pluralism. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 49, 28–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Fumerton, R. (2002). Realism and the correspondence theory of truth. Boston: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Kirkham, R. (1992). Theories of truth: A critical introduction. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Lynch, M. P. (Ed.) (2001). The nature of truth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Lynch, M. P. A functionalist theory of truth, pp. 723–750 Lynch [8].Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Lynch, M. P. (2004). Truth and multiple realizability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82(3), 384–408.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Lynch, M. P. (2006). ReWrighting pluralism. The Monist, 89, 63–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Lynch, M. P. (2009). Truth as one and many. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Newman, A. (2002). The correspondence theory of truth: An essay on the metaphysics of predication. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. 12.
    Page, S. (2006). Mind-independence disambiguated: Separating the meat from the straw in the realism/anti-realism debate. Ratio, 19, 321–335.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Pedersen, N. J. L. L. (2006). What can the problem of mixed inferences teach us about alethic pluralism? The Monist, 89, 103–117.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. 14.
    Pedersen, N. J. L. L. (2010). Stabilizing alethic pluralism. Philosophical Quarterly, 60, 92–108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. 15.
    Pedersen, N. J. L. L. (2012). True alethic functionalism? International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 20, 125–133.Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Pedersen, N. J. L. L., & Edwards, D. (2011). Truth as one(s) and many: On Lynch’s alethic functionalism. Analytic Philosophy, 52, 213–230.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. 17.
    Pedersen, N. J. L. L., & Wright, C. D. (2013). Pluralism about truth as alethic disjunctivism, pp. 146–188 in Pedersen and Wright [20].Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    Pedersen, N. J. L. L., & Wright, C. D. (2013). Truth and pluralism: Current debates. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Priest, G. (2006). In contradiction (2nd edn). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. 20.
    Shapiro, S. (2000). Thinking about mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    Vision, G. (2004). Veritas: The correspondence theory and its critics. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    Walker, R. (1988). The coherence theory of truth. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Wright, C. (1993). Strict finitism. In: His realism, meaning and truth (2nd edn, pp. 107–175). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    Wright, C. (1993). Davidsonian meaning-theory and assertibility. In: His realism, meaning and truth, (2nd edn, pp. 403–432). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
  25. 25.
    Wright, C. (1992). Truth and objectivity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  26. 26.
    Wright C. Minimalism, deflationism, pragmatism, pluralism, pp. 751–789 in Lynch [8].Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Underwood International College, Veritas Hall B 427Yonsei University International CampusIncheonSouth Korea

Personalised recommendations