, Volume 79, Supplement 1, pp 155–172 | Cite as

Disagreement, Relativism and Doxastic Revision

  • J. Adam CarterEmail author


I investigate the implication of the truth-relativist’s alleged ‘faultless disagreements’ for issues in the epistemology of disagreement. A conclusion I draw is that the type of disagreement the truth-relativist claims (as a key advantage over the contextualist) to preserve fails in principle to be epistemically significant in the way we should expect disagreements to be in social-epistemic practice. In particular, the fact of faultless disagreement fails to ever play the epistemically significant role of making doxastic revision (at least sometimes) rationally required for either party in a (faultless) disagreement. That the truth-relativists’ disagreements over centred content fail to play this epistemically significant role that disagreements characteristically play in social epistemology should leave us sceptical that disagreement is what the truth-relativist has actually preserved.


Epistemic Modal Knowledge Attribution Epistemic Possibility Conversational Context Personal Taste 
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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy and Ethics, School of Innovation SciencesEindhoven University of TechnologyEindhovenThe Netherlands

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