, Volume 79, Supplement 1, pp 1–10 | Cite as


  • Daniel Cohnitz
  • Teresa Marques


This special issue of Erkenntnis is devoted to the varieties of disagreement that arise in different areas of discourse, and the consequences we should draw from these disagreements, either concerning the subject matter and its objectivity, or concerning our own views about this subject matter if we learn, for example, that an epistemic peer disagrees with our view. In this introduction we sketch the background to the recent philosophical discussions of these questions, and the location occupied therein by the articles in this collection.


Relativist Account Epistemic Position Epistemic Situation Normative Agreement Faultless Disagreement 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



The idea for this special issue originated at a workshop Disagreements that took place in Tartu on August 28, 2011, as the first workshop of the EUROCORES project “Communication in Context: Shared Understanding in a Complex World”.2 Some of the papers in this issue were presented at this workshop, others were submitted in response to a call for papers that we published after the workshop. We received a surprising amount of submissions in response to our call, which indicates that this is currently a very hot topic in philosophy of language, meta-ethics, meta-ontology and epistemology. We would like to thank all authors for their submissions. Because of the many submissions received, we are indebted to a large number of referees that helped us review all the submissions quickly. Special thanks to Gunnar Björnsson, Alexander Davies, Manuel García-Carpintero, Jussi Haukioja, Sören Häggqvist, John Perry, Bryan Pickel, Folke Tersman, and Moritz Schultz for their help and advice, and to Hannes Leitgeb for supporting the publication of this special issue in Erkenntnis. Our editorial work on this issue was supported by Estonian Science Foundation Grants SFLFI11085E and SF0180110s08; by Portuguese Science Foundation Grants EuroUnders/0001/2010 and PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010; by Spanish Grants FFI2010-16049 and CSD2009-00056 and by the AGAUR of the Generalitat de Catalunya Grant 2009SGR-1077.


  1. Christensen, D. (2007). Epistemology of disagreement: The good news. Philosophical Review, 116, 187–217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Hume, D. (1757). Of the standard of taste. In T. H. Green & T. H. Grose (Eds.), Essays moral, political and literary by David Hume (Vol. 1, pp. 266–284), reprint of the new edition 1882 (1964 Scientia Verlag Aalen).Google Scholar
  3. James, W. (1904). Pragmatism: A new name for some old ways of thinking. Filiquarian Publishing, LLC., 2007.Google Scholar
  4. MacFarlane, J. (2007). Relativism and disagreement. Philosophical Studies, 132(1), 17–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. MacFarlane, J. (ms). Assessment sensitivity: Relative truth and its applications. (Accessed on-line at on August 2012).

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.TartuEstonia
  2. 2.LisbonPortugal

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