Abstract
In earlier work, I have argued that self-referential assertions of the form ‘this assertion is improper’ are paradoxical for the truth account of assertion. In this paper, I argue that such assertions are also paradoxical, though in a different way, for the knowledge account of assertion.
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Notes
Some theorists (e.g. Williamson 2000: Chap. 11) formulate the knowledge account as merely a necessity claim: one’s assertion that p is proper only if one knows p. If one distinguishes epistemic propriety from other types of propriety (relevance, politeness, etc.), however, then the biconditional claim is arguably just as plausible as the necessity claim (Hawthorne 2004: 23 n. 58 makes a similar point. For a detailed discussion, see Brown 2010).
References
Brown, J. (2010). Knowledge and assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81, 549–566.
DeRose, K. (2002). Assertion, knowledge, and context. The Philosophical Review, 111, 167–203.
Hawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pelling, C. A self-referential paradox for the truth account of assertion. Analysis. (forthcoming)
Weiner, M. (2005). Must we know what we say? The Philosophical Review, 114, 227–251.
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Pelling, C. Paradox and the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Erkenn 78, 977–978 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9360-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9360-0