, Volume 76, Issue 2, pp 243–261 | Cite as

Explaining Perceptual Entitlement

Original Article


This paper evaluates the prospects of harnessing “anti-individualism” about the contents of perceptual states to give an account of the epistemology of perception, making special reference to Tyler Burge’s (2003) paper, “Perceptual Entitlement”. I start by clarifying what kind of warrant is provided by perceptual experience, and I go on to survey different ways one might explain the warrant provided by perceptual experience in terms of anti-individualist views about the individuation of perceptual states. I close by motivating accounts which instead give a more prominent role to consciousness.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Sage School of PhilosophyCornell UniversityIthacaUSA

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