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Erkenntnis

, Volume 78, Issue 2, pp 245–252 | Cite as

Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology

  • Christoph KelpEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

Pritchard (Synthese 175,133–51, 2010) and Vaesen (Synthese forthcoming) have recently argued that robust virtue epistemology does not square with the extended cognition thesis that has enjoyed an increasing degree of popularity in recent philosophy of mind. This paper shows that their arguments fail. The relevant cases of extended cognition pose no new problem for robust virtue epistemology. It is shown that Pritchard’s and Vaesen’s cases can be dealt with in familiar ways by a number of virtue theories of knowledge.

Keywords

Cognitive Ability True Belief Causal Explanation Knowledge Attribution Gettier Case 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to John Greco, Duncan Pritchard and the audiences of the Workshop on Knowledge, Safety and Virtue at the University of Geneva, the Philosophy Colloquium at St. Louis University and the Epistemology and Extended Cognition Workshop at the University of Edinburgh for helpful comments on this paper. This work was funded by a postdoctoral fellowship with Research Foundation – Flanders.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of PhilosophyUniversity of LeuvenLeuvenBelgium

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