Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology
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Pritchard (Synthese 175,133–51, 2010) and Vaesen (Synthese forthcoming) have recently argued that robust virtue epistemology does not square with the extended cognition thesis that has enjoyed an increasing degree of popularity in recent philosophy of mind. This paper shows that their arguments fail. The relevant cases of extended cognition pose no new problem for robust virtue epistemology. It is shown that Pritchard’s and Vaesen’s cases can be dealt with in familiar ways by a number of virtue theories of knowledge.
KeywordsCognitive Ability True Belief Causal Explanation Knowledge Attribution Gettier Case
Thanks to John Greco, Duncan Pritchard and the audiences of the Workshop on Knowledge, Safety and Virtue at the University of Geneva, the Philosophy Colloquium at St. Louis University and the Epistemology and Extended Cognition Workshop at the University of Edinburgh for helpful comments on this paper. This work was funded by a postdoctoral fellowship with Research Foundation – Flanders.
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