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Witchcraft, Relativism and the Problem of the Criterion

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Abstract

This paper presents a naturalistic response to the challenge of epistemic relativism. The case of the Azande poison oracle is employed as an example of an alternative epistemic norm which may be used to justify beliefs about everyday occurrences. While a distinction is made between scepticism and relativism, an argument in support of epistemic relativism is presented that is based on the sceptical problem of the criterion. A response to the resulting relativistic position is then provided on the basis of a particularist response to scepticism combined with a naturalistic approach to the warrant of epistemic norms. It is argued that it is possible to comparatively assess the ability of epistemic norms to lead to epistemic aims. As against the epistemic relativist, it is possible to provide an objective basis for the choice between alternative epistemic norms.

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Notes

  1. Sextus Empiricus (1933) speaks of a “criterion of truth” that is used to “judge of reality and non-reality” (Outlines of Pyrrhonism, II, 14–16). Since an epistemic norm is used to justify belief, and since belief involves belief in the truth of the content of the belief, an epistemic norm plays the same role as a “criterion of truth”.

  2. Strictly speaking, the Pyrrhonian sceptic does not conclude that knowledge is impossible. This would be to adopt a stance of dogmatism characteristic of earlier Academic scepticism. Instead of such dogmatism, the Pyrrhonian advocates suspension of belief (cf. Sextus, op. cit. I, 25–28). Still, the stronger form of words employed in the text seems entirely defensible. Pyrrhonian scepticism leads to the rejection of knowledge on at least two counts. First, suspension of belief entails absence of knowledge. If belief is required for knowledge, and belief is suspended, then there is no knowledge, since there is no belief. Second, the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion entails that beliefs may not be rationally justified. But since rational justification is required for knowledge, and there is no rational justification, there is no knowledge.

  3. See, for example, Amico (1993, chapter 4). For an overview of the criticism as well as a defence of particularism, see Lemos (2004, chapter 6).

  4. An example of an author who equates particularism with reflective equilibrium is Lemos (2004, pp. 6–10). See Greco (2005), who argues against the equation. One also encounters suggestions that reflective equilibrium is superior to particularism. But it is hard to see why the particularist should concede that core instances of knowledge (e.g., that one has hands) might give way in the face of conflict with general principles.

  5. For detailed discussion of begging the question in the context of Chisholm’s defence of particularism, see Lemos (2004, pp. 125–128). Lemos argues that Chisholm’s defence is an example of an argument that is rationally conclusive even though it begs the question against an opposing party. Such arguments proceed by valid inference from premises known to be true despite all parties not accepting the premises (2004, p. 127).

  6. While there is a clear affinity between the particularist approach and the naturalism I here adopt, it should be noted that Chisholm himself favoured a traditional internalist epistemology (cf. Chisholm, 1989, p. vii). However, I do not see any reason to suppose that the particularist approach is necessarily wed to internalism. To the contrary, the internalist and the naturalist may both agree that we are able to recognize particular instances of knowledge.

  7. The idea that epistemic norms are to be understood in instrumental fashion is an idea with deep roots in the pragmatist tradition. However, the immediate source for my use of the idea is the methodological pragmatism of Rescher (1977). Rescher speaks of methods rather than norms. But norms may be thought of as methods for the justification of beliefs, so there is no relevant difference in the present context. A naturalistic version of the idea may be found in Laudan (1996, chapter 7), who argues persuasively that the rules of scientific method are subject to empirical appraisal based on their track record in promoting epistemic aims.

  8. It might be objected in reliabilist vein that justification does not require evidence that a norm lead to an aim. It suffices that the norm does in fact lead to the aim, whether or not there is evidence that it does so. But a reliabilist who raises such an objection is unable to provide a basis for adjudication between alternative epistemic norms in response to the relativist challenge. While there is much to be said for reliabilism, the challenge of relativism brings out a weakness in the reliabilist position. For in order to respond to relativism, it is crucial that evidence be available of the comparative reliability of epistemic norms, at least in principle.

  9. The naturalistic approach to the appraisal of epistemic norms that I suggest places an emphasis on empirically ascertainable realization of epistemic aims. But naturalistic approaches typically appeal to the results of theoretical science over and above merely observable matters of fact. I do not oppose, indeed, I fully embrace such approaches. However, in the present context it is important to focus on something that may serve as common ground between the Azande and ourselves, which is why I focus here on empirical knowledge. It is important to establish the credentials of epistemic norms at a base level before one draws upon the theoretical knowledge that has been built on the basis of the higher level epistemic norms found in the sciences.

  10. The strategy I employ here is a version of a strategy that Philip Kitcher has described in another context as ‘the Galilean strategy’ (2001, p. 173). When confronted with the problem of establishing the reliability of the telescope in the face of doubt, Galileo first employed the telescope in circumstances in which it was possible to employ empirical means to determine its reliability. Galileo pointed the telescope at distant buildings or ships entering a harbour in such a way that it was possible to subsequently verify by direct observation details which had at first been detected only through the telescope. Once the reliability of the telescope was established in circumstances which were amenable to direct empirical test, it was a simple matter of then extending use of the telescope to circumstances in which what was perceived through the telescope was not subject to direct inspection. Provided that there is no independent reason to expect the telescope to fail in such circumstances, the telescope is to be presumed reliable when applied in such further circumstances.

  11. Indeed, Evans-Pritchard devotes the bulk of a chapter to the fact that Azande do not adopt an experimental attitude toward the poison oracle, as well as the various mechanisms at their disposal by which they may explain away one or another failure of the oracle (1976, chapter 9).

  12. Strictly speaking, this discussion is to be conducted at the meta-level, since it relates to the question of whether a higher-order norm of empirical reliability may be utilized to evaluate the lower-level norms employed within a culture to evaluate beliefs. However, I do not think there is any risk of undue ambiguity that arises from glossing over the distinction of levels here.

  13. Indeed, it is something of a favourite, having been raised on various occasions when I have presented this paper, as well as by the anonymous referees for this journal.

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Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the audiences for discussion of this material when it was presented in seminars at the University of Hyderabad, the University of Melbourne, the University of Münster and Massey University. I am indebted to Steve Clarke, David Cockburn, Karen Jones and Thomas Uebel for comments on earlier versions of the paper. I also wish to thank anonymous referees whose comments I have taken into account in revising this paper for publication.

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Correspondence to Howard Sankey.

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Sankey, H. Witchcraft, Relativism and the Problem of the Criterion. Erkenn 72, 1–16 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-009-9193-7

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