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Erkenntnis

, Volume 67, Issue 1, pp 1–16 | Cite as

Causation and Counterfactual Dependence

  • Sungho ChoiEmail author
Article

Abstract

Recently Stephen Barker has raised stimulating objections to the thesis that, roughly speaking, if two events stand in a relation of counterfactual dependence, they stand in a causal relation. As Ned Hall says, however, this thesis constitutes the strongest part of the counterfactual analysis of causation. Therefore, if successful, Barker’s objections will undermine the cornerstone of the counterfactual analysis of causation, and hence give us compelling reasons to reject the counterfactual analysis of causation. I will argue, however, that they do not withstand scrutiny.

Keywords

Actual World Downward Movement Counterfactual Dependence Downward Force Counterfactual Analysis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Stephen Barker and two anonymous referees for their very useful suggestions on early drafts of this paper.

References

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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Programs in History and Philosophy of Science, College of Natural SciencesSeoul National UniversityKwan-ak-gu, SeoulKorea
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyQueen’s UniversityKingstonCanada
  3. 3.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of SydneyMain Quad, A14Australia

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