Recently Stephen Barker has raised stimulating objections to the thesis that, roughly speaking, if two events stand in a relation of counterfactual dependence, they stand in a causal relation. As Ned Hall says, however, this thesis constitutes the strongest part of the counterfactual analysis of causation. Therefore, if successful, Barker’s objections will undermine the cornerstone of the counterfactual analysis of causation, and hence give us compelling reasons to reject the counterfactual analysis of causation. I will argue, however, that they do not withstand scrutiny.
KeywordsActual World Downward Movement Counterfactual Dependence Downward Force Counterfactual Analysis
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I would like to thank Stephen Barker and two anonymous referees for their very useful suggestions on early drafts of this paper.
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