Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Contingent Objects and the Barcan Formula

  • Published:
Erkenntnis Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

It has been argued by Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta, and independently by Timothy Williamson, that the best quantified modal logic is one that validates both the Barcan Formula and its converse. This requires that domains be fixed across all possible worlds. All objects exist necessarily; some – those we would usually consider contingent – are concrete at some worlds and non-concrete (but still existent) at others. Linsky and Zalta refer to such objects as ‘contingently non-concrete’. I defend the standard usage of the word ‘exists’, and the view that many objects exist only contingently. I argue that the Linsky/Zalta analysis, and to a lesser extent Williamson’s, suffers not only from a peculiar ontology but also from two related formal difficulties. Their analysis gives either counter-intuitive or ad hoc results about essences, and it fails to accommodate contingently existing abstracta.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Fine, K.: 1994, ‘Essence and Modality’, in Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 8: Logic and Language, Ridgeview, Atascadero, pp. 1--16.

  • D. Lewis (1968) ArticleTitle‘Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic’ Journal of Philosophy 65 113–126

    Google Scholar 

  • Linsky, B. and E. Zalta: 1994, ‘In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic’, in, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 8: Logic and Language, Ridgeview, Atascadero, pp. 431–458

  • B. Linsky E. Zalta (1996) ArticleTitle‘In Defense of the Contingently Nonconcrete’ Philosophical Studies 84 283–294 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00354491

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • R. B. Marcus (1946) ArticleTitle‘A Functional Calculus of First Order Based on Strict Implication’ Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 1–16

    Google Scholar 

  • Plantinga, A.: 1976, ‘Actualism and Possible Worlds’, Theoria 42, 139–160. Reprinted in Michael J. Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1979, pp. 253–273

  • A. L. Thomasson (1996) ArticleTitle‘Fiction, Modality and Dependent Abstracta’ Philosophical Studies 84 295–320 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00354492

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • A. L. Thomasson (1999) Fiction and Metaphysics Cambridge University Press Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • T. Williamson (1998) ArticleTitle‘Bare Possibilia’ Erkenntnis 48 IssueID2–3 257–273

    Google Scholar 

  • T. Williamson (2000) ArticleTitle‘Existence and Contingency’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 IssueID1 117–139 Occurrence Handle10.1111/1467-9264.00069

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, P.O. Box 880321, Lincoln, NE, 68588-0321, USA

    Reina Hayaki

Authors
  1. Reina Hayaki
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Reina Hayaki.

Additional information

Manuscript submitted 21 February 2003 Final version received 24 June 2005

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Hayaki, R. Contingent Objects and the Barcan Formula. Erkenntnis 64, 75–83 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-005-0294-7

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-005-0294-7

Keywords

Search

Navigation