Abstract
Previous research in the health, aviation, and construction sectors, principally with operators, has found that individual blame for small failures discourages hazard and incident reporting and so adversely impacts disaster prevention. This finding has widely influenced practice in organizations relying on engineers, although the extent to which it applies to this work domain has been subject to limited empirical research. Based on a survey of Australian engineers (n = 275), in this article we examine how personal legal liability considerations impact on hazard and incident reporting and the less formal practice of telling stories about events. We found that 48% of engineers are more likely to report hazards as a result of their personal liability concerns. Only 5% indicated that they were less likely to report hazards. We suggest that these findings are due to the nature of engineering work, where decision-making is distributed across time, place, and people. In this context, reporting and informally telling of risks and hazards to others in the organization is understood to transfer responsibility for remedial action and so limit one’s personal liability. While there is some trepidation among engineers as to whether this strategy, among other work practices, will be sufficient protection, they see this as acting professionally and as such the ‘right’ thing to do.
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This respondent is referring to the scrutiny of personnel operating Wivenhoe Dam during the 2010–2011 flood events in Queensland, Australia. Dozens were killed in the floods, thousands were evacuated and economic losses are estimated at 15.9 billion Australian Dollars. As part of a broad ranging Commission of Inquiry, the extent to which the engineers operated Wivenhoe Dam in accordance with the procedures was critically examined. There were questions about whether criminal action was appropriate, though charges were never laid. A Class Action lawsuit remains ongoing.
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Acknowledgements
This work was funded by the Energy Pipelines CRC, supported through the Australian Government’s Cooperative Research Centres Program. The cash and in-kind support from the APGA RSC is gratefully acknowledged. We acknowledge the support of Engineers Australia Queensland Division in distributing the survey and the interest they have expressed in the results. We also acknowledge the survey participants who contributed to this study. Many of the respondents expressed a desire to contribute to the future of their profession and they saw our survey as a vehicle to do so. They deserve our sincere thanks.
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Selected survey questions
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Some engineers work in jobs that involve high stakes decisions – decisions where the wrong choice could have serious consequences now or into the future, e.g. fatalities of workers or of members of the public, significant environmental damage. In your role as an engineer, are you responsible for making high stakes decisions? (Closed).
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To what extent do you think about your personal liability when you make high stakes decisions? (Closed).
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Taking into account all of the potential risks and benefits, to what extent do you think it’s useful to consider personal liability when making high stakes decisions as an engineer? (Closed).
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Can you please explain further? (Open).
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To what extent do you think about your personal liability when you make decisions? (Closed).
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In what ways do liability concerns help to improve your decision-making as an engineer? Select all that apply. (Mixed, includes 'Other—please specify').
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In what ways do liability concerns negatively impact your decision-making as an engineer? Select all that apply. (Mixed, includes 'Other—please specify').
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Taking into account all of the potential risks and benefits, to what extent do you think it’s useful to consider personal liability when making decisions as an engineer? (Closed).
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Can you please explain further? (Open).
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Thinking about your personal liability, what are you concerned about specifically? Select all that apply. (Mixed, includes 'Other—please specify').
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Has your attitude to your personal liability changed over time? (Closed).
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What prompted you to change your attitude to your personal liability? (Open).
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Are you aware of the serious incidents that occurred in the following locations? Select all that apply. (Closed).
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Were you concerned about the way in which some individuals were treated in the aftermath of the incident(s) you selected in the previous question? Only select the incident(s) for which you felt a level of concern. (Closed).
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To what extent has this incident (or these incidents) influenced your attitudes towards your personal liability? (Closed).
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Can you provide more details? (Open).
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Do you know any engineers who have personally experienced problems in relation to personal liability? (Closed).
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How has this influenced your own professional practice? (Open).
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Does your organization provide a formal system for its employees to report hazards? (Closed).
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If you have encountered a hazard, did you report it into your organization’s formal system? (Closed).
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Why didn't you report the hazard into your organization's formal system? (Open).
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Does the risk of your personal liability make it more or less likely that you will report hazards into your organization's formal system? (Closed).
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Does the risk of your personal liability make it more or less likely that you will share stories of things that have gone wrong with colleagues so that lessons can be learned? (Closed).
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Are you aware of any engineers (other than yourself) who were unwilling to share stories of things going wrong due to their concerns about their personal liability? (Closed).
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Without disclosing the identity of the engineer, can you provide any further details? (Open).
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Maslen, S., Hayes, J., Wong, J. et al. Witch hunts and scapegoats: an investigation into the impact of personal liability concerns on engineers’ reporting of risks. Environ Syst Decis 40, 413–426 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10669-020-09757-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10669-020-09757-0