Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Tripartite evolutionary game analysis of carbon emission reduction behavior strategies under government regulation

  • Published:
Environment, Development and Sustainability Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Promoting corporate carbon reduction is key to achieving sustainable development, and carbon trading policies are important institutional choices for governments of various countries to promote green development and actively respond to climate change. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, high-carbon emission manufacturers and carbon quota suppliers, and subsequent simulation analyses were conducted. The main results of the study are as follows: (1) The evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)  of the three stakeholders is as follows: loose regulation by the government, active emission reduction by manufacturers, and in-chain trading by suppliers. (2) The increase of excess carbon emissions inhibits manufacturers’ choice of active emission reduction and suppliers’ choice of in-chain trading and promotes the government’s choice of strict regulation. Strict government regulation can improve the degree of cooperation between manufacturers and suppliers to achieve carbon reduction targets at a faster speed. (3) There is a critical value for the probability of manufacturers actively reducing emissions. Above this critical value, suppliers tend to choose off-chain transactions, otherwise, suppliers tend to choose in-chain transactions. The results of this study can serve as a reference for the decarbonization path of supply chain member enterprises and offer valuable suggestions for the government to achieve a low-carbon society.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5
Fig.6
Fig. 7
Fig. 8
Fig. 9
Fig.10
Fig. 11
Fig. 12
Fig. 13
Fig. 14
Fig.15
Fig. 16
Fig. 17

Similar content being viewed by others

Availability of data and materials

No data was used for the research described in the article.

References

Download references

Funding

This work was supported by the National Social Science Fund of China (Grant no. 18BGL182).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Contributions

Wei Jie provided the direction and gave guidance to the paper. Li Yining conducted the analysis of the evolutionary game and data simulation, and was a major contributor to the manuscript writing. Liu Yushun determined the content including background, object, method of the research in the early stage of the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Yining Li.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

The authors have no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose.

Ethical approval

Not applicable.

Consent to participate

All authors participated in this article.

Consent to publish

All authors have given consent to the publication of this article.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Wei, J., Li, Y. & Liu, Y. Tripartite evolutionary game analysis of carbon emission reduction behavior strategies under government regulation. Environ Dev Sustain (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-024-04972-0

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-024-04972-0

Keywords

Navigation