Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Blockchain-enabled enterprise bleaching green regulation banking evolution game analysis

  • Published:
Environment, Development and Sustainability Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The emergence of greenwashing and corporate defaults is harming the effectiveness of green credit implementation, leading to a gradual increase in regulatory pressure on banks. The widespread use of blockchain technology in the financial sector provides banks with regulatory transparency. Blockchain will be introduced into the evolutionary game in this paper to analyze the behavioral choices of banks and firms regarding green credit and to discuss in depth the impact of blockchain-related and internal parameters through numerical simulations. The study shows that (1) blockchain penalties are more significant disincentives to enterprise default or greenwash, while banks are more sensitive to changes in blockchain costs; (2) greenwashing can lead to excessive losses or high regulatory costs for banks, increasing the likelihood that the game system will evolve toward an ideal state (keep, on the chain); (3) there is a threshold for green credit lines that can reduce greenwashing and increase the incentive for banks to adopt blockchain regulation, while exceeding this threshold leads to greenwashing or defaults and banks opting for traditional regulation. This paper puts forward corresponding suggestions from the blockchain technology application, government, and social levels to provide reference significance for the effective realization of green credit regulation.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
€32.70 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Price includes VAT (France)

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5
Fig. 6
Fig. 7
Fig. 8
Fig. 9

Similar content being viewed by others

Availability of data and materials

All data generated or analyzed during this study are included in this published article.

References

Download references

Acknowledgements

The authors acknowledge the anonymous reviewers and editors for helpful guidance on prior versions of the article.

Funding

This study was funded by the Social Science Foundation of Heilongjiang Province, "Research on Decision-making and Risk Early Warning Mechanism of Agricultural Products Supply Chain Financing Based on Blockchain Technology" (20GLB114); Harbin University of Commerce, Research Project (2019DS008).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Contributions

All authors contributed to the study's conception and design. Material preparation, XL proposed the core idea and revised this manuscript; TT was the major contributor in writing the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Tingting Tian.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

The authors declare no competing interests.

Ethics approval and consent to participate

Not applicable.

Consent for publication

Not applicable.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Xu, L., Tian, T. Blockchain-enabled enterprise bleaching green regulation banking evolution game analysis. Environ Dev Sustain 26, 27457–27483 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-023-03768-y

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-023-03768-y

Keywords

Navigation