Abstract
In this paper, we construct a multi-stage coordinated programming model under tax system to control SO2 emission. The model is based on an explicitly formulated SO2 abatement cost function created under Chinese condition. Analysis of the effectiveness and impact on the economy of the model is carried out with consideration of game theory. By solving the model, theoretical results show that the volume-based multi-stage SO2 tax system has two properties: effectiveness and equal-rate. Based on these theoretical results, empirical study is also performed using Chinese historical data. Compared with yearly single-stage programming model, the tax rate generated by the coordinated multi-stage programming model is time-invariant and rather moderate in scale. The total abatement cost among planning years in our model is 21.03 % less than the actual number and 6.68 % less than that in the single-stage situation. The tax payment suggested by our model is 10.62 % less than by the single-stage model. In general, a coordinated multi-stage programming model helps reduce the overall costs of environmental protection while achieving the same emission control target with less burden added to the economy.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Levy is a tax collected for temporary uses, see Taylor [9].
For instance, the Chinese 11th FYP allocates the total emission control target among five planning years and then control is taken annually.
η ki ≠ 0; otherwise,\( {Y}_i={e}^{\alpha_i}{W}_{kij}^{\beta_i}{\eta}_{ki}^{\gamma_i}+{W}_{kij}{g}_{kij}{\eta}_{ki}{t}_k\to \mathit{\infty} \)because γ i < 0.
We use sector here instead of industry to simplify our analysis, since the three sectors consisted of industries of similar nature.
References
Florig, H. K., Spofford Jr., W. O., & Xiaoying Ma, Z. M. (1995). China strives to make the polluter pay. Environmental Science & Technology, 29(6), 268A–273A.
yuan, L. (2015). System design of water pollution tax. Review of Economic Research, 54, 17–18 in Chinese.
Sun, C., Yuan, X., & Yao, X. (2016). Social acceptance towards the air pollution in China: evidence from public’s willingness to pay for smog mitigation. Energy Policy, 92, 313–324.
Zhang, X., & Zhang, P. (2001). Analysis of Foundation of Green Economics: reconsideration of population, resources, and environmental economics. Ecological Economy, 11, 75–77 in Chinese.
Keohane, N. O. (2009). Cap and trade, rehabilitated: using tradable permits to control U.S. greenhouse gases. Review of Environmental Economics & Policy, 3(1), 1–21.
Kostka, G. (2013). China’s evolving green planning system: are targets the answer? (No. 201). Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
Li, X., Wu, X., & Zhang, F. (2015). A method for analyzing pollution control policies: application to SO2 emissions in China. Energy Economics, 49, 451–459.
Stavins, R. N. (1995). Transaction costs and tradeable permits. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 29(2), 133–148.
Taylor, M. (2012). Is it a levy, or is it a tax, or both? Revenue Law Journal, 22(1), 188.
Chen, Y., Ebenstein, A., Greenstone, M., & Li, H. (2013). Evidence on the impact of sustained exposure to air pollution on life expectancy from China’s Huai River policy. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(32), 12936–12941.
Kan, H., Chen, R., & Tong, S. (2012). Ambient air pollution, climate change, and population health in China. Environment International, 42, 10–19.
Zhou, M., Liu, Y., Wang, L., Kuang, X., Xu, X., & Kan, H. (2014). Particulate air pollution and mortality in a cohort of Chinese men. Environmental Pollution, 186, 1–6.
Pigou, A. C. (1932). The economics of welfare, 1920. London: McMillan&Co.
Ramsey, F. P. (1927). A contribution to the theory of taxation. The Economic Journal, 37(145), 47–61.
Tullock, G. (1967). Excess benefit. Water Resources Research, 3(2), 643–644.
Goulder, L. H., & Schneider, S. H. (1999). Induced technological change and the attractiveness of CO2 abatement policies. Resource and Energy Economics, 21(3), 211–253.
Jaeger, W. K. (2002). Carbon taxation when climate affects productivity. Land Economics, 78(3), 354–367.
Coase, R. H. (1960). The problem of social cost. In Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics (pp. 87–137). Palgrave Macmillan UK.
Dales, J. H. (2002). Pollution, property & prices: an essay in policy-making and economics. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Ellerman, A. D. (2000). Markets for clean air: the US acid rain program. Cambridge University Press.
Ellerman, A. D. (2002). Designing a tradable permit system to control SO2 emissions in China: principles and practice. The Energy Journal, 23(2), 1–26.
Metcalf, G. E. (2009). Allocation issues in greenhouse gas cap and trade systems. Testimony before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, US Senate.
Pizer, W. (1999). Choosing price or quantity controls for greenhouse gases, Climate Issues Brief No. 17, Resources for the Future. Washington, DC, July.
Wittneben, B. B. (2009). Exxon is right: let us re-examine our choice for a cap-and-trade system over a carbon tax. Energy Policy, 37(6), 2462–2464.
Chang, Y. C., & Wang, N. (2010). Environmental regulations and emissions trading in China. Energy Policy, 38(7), 3356–3364.
Tao, J., & Mah, D. N. Y. (2009). Between market and state: dilemmas of environmental governance in China’s sulphur dioxide emission trading system. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 27(1), 175–188.
Zhang, B., Zhang, H., Liu, B., & Bi, J. (2013). Policy interactions and underperforming emission trading markets in China. Environmental Science & Technology, 47(13), 7077–7084.
Ge, C., & Wang, J. (2001). Use of market mechanism to abate the pollution: pollution charges, environmental taxes and emissions trading. Review of Economic Research, 1482(2), 28–43 in Chinese.
Xu, W., (2011). Study of environmental tax reformation during the 12th 5-year planning of China. Environment and Sustainable Development, No.4, 27–29. (in Chinese)
Goulder, L. H., Parry, I. W., Williams Iii, R. C., & Burtraw, D. (1999). The cost-effectiveness of alternative instruments for environmental protection in a second-best setting. Journal of Public Economics, 72(3), 329–360.
Garbaccio, R. F., Ho, M. S., & Jorgenson, D. W. (1999). Controlling carbon emissions in China. Environment and Development Economics, 4(04), 493–518.
Okushima, S., & Yamashita, H. (2005). A general equilibrium analysis of waste management policy in Japan. Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 111–134.
Liang, Q. M., & Wei, Y. M. (2012). Distributional impacts of taxing carbon in China: results from the CEEPA model. Applied Energy, 92, 545–551.
Tong, J., & Shen, Y. (2011). Analysis of environmental protection effects of environmental subsidies based on CGE mode. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 5, 33–40 in Chinese.
Ljunggren Söderman, M., Eriksson, O., Björklund, A., Östblom, G., Ekvall, T., Finnveden, G., & Sundqvist, J. O. (2016). Integrated economic and environmental assessment of waste policy instruments. Sustainability, 8(5), 411.
Jiang, T. (2001). Earmarking of pollution charges and the sub-optimal of the Pigouvian tax. The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 45, 623–640.
Cheng, C., & Lai, Y. (2012). Does a stricter enforcement policy protect the environment? A political economy perspective. Resource and Energy Economics, 34, 431–441.
Liu, F., Lu, Z., (2009). Optimal environmental tax and its supporting policies under economic growth framework: Data based computation of China. Management Word, No.6, 40–50. (in Chinese)
Bird, C. G., & Kortanek, K. O. (1974). Game theoretic approaches to some air pollution regulation problems. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 8(3), 141–147.
Okada, N., & Mikami, Y. (1992). A game-theoretic approach to acid rain abatement: conflict analysis of environmental load allocation. JAWRA Journal of the American Water Resources Association, 28(1), 155–162.
Samuelson, P., & Nordahus, W. (2002). Economics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Ma, T., & Takeuchi, K. (2016). Controlling SO2 emissions in China: a panel data analysis of the 11th Five-Year Plan (No. 1609).
Cao, D., Song, C., Wang, J., Jiang, H., Li, W., & Cao, G. (2009). Establishment and empirical analysis of cost function for pollution combination abatement. Research of Environmental Sciences, 22(3), 371–376 in Chinese.
Du, N., Cao, D., & Yang, H. (2007). Research on air pollution abatement cost function of industrial enterprise. Sci. Technol. Eng, 17(6), 1116–1118 in Chinese.
Metcalf, G. E. (2007). A proposal for a US carbon tax swap: an equitable tax reform to address global climate change," The Hamilton Project, Brookings Institution. October.
Boutabba, M. A., Beaumais, O., & Lardic, S. (2012). Permit price dynamics in the US SO 2 trading program: a cointegration approach. Energy Economics, 34(3), 714–722.
Dasgupta, S., Wang, H., & Wheeler, D. (1997). Surviving success: policy reform and the future of industrial pollution in China (No. 1856). World Bank Publications.
Acknowledgments
This research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Numbers 71471042 and 71071037).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Li, X., Liu, Z., Xu, Q. et al. Optimal Policy Mechanism Design for Cross-Sector and Multi-Stage Pollution Control with a Bilevel Model: Application to SO2 Emission in China. Environ Model Assess 22, 243–255 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10666-016-9533-3
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10666-016-9533-3