This paper uses a dynamic model to explore the issue of irrigation-induced salinity, which puts irrigation at risk in most irrigated areas throughout the world. We address the design of instruments that an irrigation district board could implement to induce irrigators to take sustainable irrigation decisions. In our approach, the irrigators located above an aquifer participate in the accumulation of groundwater, a stock pollution. We analyse input-based instruments to induce the agents to follow the optimal stock path.
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Legras, S., Lifran, R. Dynamic taxation schemes to manage irrigation-induced salinity. Environ Model Assess 11, 157–167 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10666-005-9031-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10666-005-9031-5