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A stochastic conflict resolution model for trading pollutant discharge permits in river systems

Environmental Monitoring and Assessment volume 154, Article number: 219 (2009) Cite this article

Abstract

This paper presents an efficient methodology for developing pollutant discharge permit trading in river systems considering the conflict of interests of involving decision-makers and the stakeholders. In this methodology, a trade-off curve between objectives is developed using a powerful and recently developed multi-objective genetic algorithm technique known as the Nondominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm-II (NSGA-II). The best non-dominated solution on the trade-off curve is defined using the Young conflict resolution theory, which considers the utility functions of decision makers and stakeholders of the system. These utility functions are related to the total treatment cost and a fuzzy risk of violating the water quality standards. The fuzzy risk is evaluated using the Monte Carlo analysis. Finally, an optimization model provides the trading discharge permit policies. The practical utility of the proposed methodology in decision-making is illustrated through a realistic example of the Zarjub River in the northern part of Iran.

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Affiliations

  1. Center of Excellence for Infrastructure Engineering and Management, School of Civil Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

    Mohammad Hossein Niksokhan, Reza Kerachian & Pedram Amin

Authors
  1. Mohammad Hossein Niksokhan
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  2. Reza Kerachian
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  3. Pedram Amin
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Correspondence to Reza Kerachian.

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Niksokhan, M.H., Kerachian, R. & Amin, P. A stochastic conflict resolution model for trading pollutant discharge permits in river systems. Environ Monit Assess 154, 219 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10661-008-0390-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10661-008-0390-7

Keywords

  • Trading discharge permits
  • Conflict resolution
  • NSGA-II
  • The Young Bargaining Theory